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      Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic Influenza — United States, 2017

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          Summary

          When a novel influenza A virus with pandemic potential emerges, nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) often are the most readily available interventions to help slow transmission of the virus in communities, which is especially important before a pandemic vaccine becomes widely available. NPIs, also known as community mitigation measures, are actions that persons and communities can take to help slow the spread of respiratory virus infections, including seasonal and pandemic influenza viruses.

          These guidelines replace the 2007 Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States — Early, Targeted, Layered Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions ( https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/11425). Several elements remain unchanged from the 2007 guidance, which described recommended NPIs and the supporting rationale and key concepts for the use of these interventions during influenza pandemics. NPIs can be phased in, or layered, on the basis of pandemic severity and local transmission patterns over time. Categories of NPIs include personal protective measures for everyday use (e.g., voluntary home isolation of ill persons, respiratory etiquette, and hand hygiene); personal protective measures reserved for influenza pandemics (e.g., voluntary home quarantine of exposed household members and use of face masks in community settings when ill); community measures aimed at increasing social distancing (e.g., school closures and dismissals, social distancing in workplaces, and postponing or cancelling mass gatherings); and environmental measures (e.g., routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces).

          Several new elements have been incorporated into the 2017 guidelines. First, to support updated recommendations on the use of NPIs, the latest scientific evidence available since the influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 pandemic has been added. Second, a summary of lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response is presented to underscore the importance of broad and flexible prepandemic planning. Third, a new section on community engagement has been included to highlight that the timely and effective use of NPIs depends on community acceptance and active participation. Fourth, to provide new or updated pandemic assessment and planning tools, the novel influenza virus pandemic intervals tool, the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool, the Pandemic Severity Assessment Framework, and a set of prepandemic planning scenarios are described. Finally, to facilitate implementation of the updated guidelines and to assist states and localities with prepandemic planning and decision-making, this report links to six supplemental prepandemic NPI planning guides for different community settings that are available online ( https://www.cdc.gov/nonpharmaceutical-interventions).

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          Modeling targeted layered containment of an influenza pandemic in the United States.

          Planning a response to an outbreak of a pandemic strain of influenza is a high public health priority. Three research groups using different individual-based, stochastic simulation models have examined the consequences of intervention strategies chosen in consultation with U.S. public health workers. The first goal is to simulate the effectiveness of a set of potentially feasible intervention strategies. Combinations called targeted layered containment (TLC) of influenza antiviral treatment and prophylaxis and nonpharmaceutical interventions of quarantine, isolation, school closure, community social distancing, and workplace social distancing are considered. The second goal is to examine the robustness of the results to model assumptions. The comparisons focus on a pandemic outbreak in a population similar to that of Chicago, with approximately 8.6 million people. The simulations suggest that at the expected transmissibility of a pandemic strain, timely implementation of a combination of targeted household antiviral prophylaxis, and social distancing measures could substantially lower the illness attack rate before a highly efficacious vaccine could become available. Timely initiation of measures and school closure play important roles. Because of the current lack of data on which to base such models, further field research is recommended to learn more about the sources of transmission and the effectiveness of social distancing measures in reducing influenza transmission.
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            Swine influenza A (H1N1) infection in two children--Southern California, March-April 2009.

            (2009)
            On April 17, 2009, CDC determined that two cases of febrile respiratory illness occurring in children who resided in adjacent counties in southern California were caused by infection with a swine influenza A (H1N1) virus. The viruses from the two cases are closely related genetically, resistant to amantadine and rimantadine, and contain a unique combination of gene segments that previously has not been reported among swine or human influenza viruses in the United States or elsewhere. Neither child had contact with pigs; the source of the infection is unknown. Investigations to identify the source of infection and to determine whether additional persons have been ill from infection with similar swine influenza viruses are ongoing. This report briefly describes the two cases and the investigations currently under way. Although this is not a new subtype of influenza A in humans, concern exists that this new strain of swine influenza A (H1N1) is substantially different from human influenza A (H1N1) viruses, that a large proportion of the population might be susceptible to infection, and that the seasonal influenza vaccine H1N1 strain might not provide protection. The lack of known exposure to pigs in the two cases increases the possibility that human-to-human transmission of this new influenza virus has occurred. Clinicians should consider animal as well as seasonal influenza virus infections in their differential diagnosis of patients who have febrile respiratory illness and who 1) live in San Diego and Imperial counties or 2) traveled to these counties or were in contact with ill persons from these counties in the 7 days preceding their illness onset, or 3) had recent exposure to pigs. Clinicians who suspect swine influenza virus infections in a patient should obtain a respiratory specimen and contact their state or local health department to facilitate testing at a state public health laboratory.
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              Inactivation of influenza A viruses in the environment and modes of transmission: A critical review

              Summary Objectives The relative importance of airborne, droplet and contact transmission of influenza A virus and the efficiency of control measures depends among other factors on the inactivation of viruses in different environmental media. Methods We systematically review available information on the environmental inactivation of influenza A viruses and employ information on infectious dose and results from mathematical models to assess transmission modes. Results Daily inactivation rate constants differ by several orders of magnitude: on inanimate surfaces and in aerosols daily inactivation rates are in the order of 1–102, on hands in the order of 103. Influenza virus can survive in aerosols for several hours, on hands for a few minutes. Nasal infectious dose of influenza A is several orders of magnitude larger than airborne infectious dose. Conclusions The airborne route is a potentially important transmission pathway for influenza in indoor environments. The importance of droplet transmission has to be reassessed. Contact transmission can be limited by fast inactivation of influenza virus on hands and is more so than airborne transmission dependent on behavioral parameters. However, the potentially large inocula deposited in the environment through sneezing and the protective effect of nasal mucus on virus survival could make contact transmission a key transmission mode.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                MMWR Recomm Rep
                MMWR Recomm Rep
                RR
                MMWR Recommendations and Reports
                Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
                1057-5987
                1545-8601
                21 April 2017
                21 April 2017
                : 66
                : 1
                : 1-32
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia
                [2 ]Office of Infectious Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia
                [3 ]Eagle Medical Services, San Antonio, Texas
                [4 ]Karna, Atlanta, Georgia
                [5 ]Division of State and Local Readiness, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia
                [6 ]Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia
                Office of Infectious Diseases, CDC,
                Influenza Coordination Unit, Office of Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Influenza Coordination Unit, Office of Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Influenza Coordination Unit, Office of Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Influenza Coordination Unit, Office of Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Influenza Coordination Unit, Office of Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Influenza Coordination Unit, Office of Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC
                Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
                CDC
                Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
                CDC
                Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
                CDC.
                Author notes
                Corresponding author: Noreen Qualls, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC. Telephone: 404-639-8195; E-mail: nqualls@ 123456cdc.gov .
                Article
                rr6601a1
                10.15585/mmwr.rr6601a1
                5837128
                28426646
                9c30962d-acb6-4d47-8a34-a3bcdc9b9598

                All material in the MMWR Series is in the public domain and may be used and reprinted without permission; citation as to source, however, is appreciated.

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