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      Revisiting the role of civil society in responses to infectious disease outbreaks: a proposed framework and lessons from a COVID-19 vaccine equity coalition in Uganda

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          Summary box Despite their long history of advancing health equity, civil society organisations are often overlooked by traditional public health institutions—governments, donors, international development organisations and others—during responses to infectious disease outbreaks, most recently COVID-19. Excluding civil society from outbreak responses decreases the ability of authorities to anticipate and respond to delivery challenges, diminishes healthcare advocacy efforts and sidelines organisations crucial to ensuring community-level trust. The Vaccine Advocacy Accelerator—which brought together civil society organisations and other stakeholders to promote COVID-19 vaccination in Uganda—offers examples of the unique roles civil society can play in community mobilisation and empowerment, service delivery and advocacy to advance COVID-19 vaccine equity which are also applicable to other outbreak responses. Based on our experience, outbreak-focused collaborations can be made more effective by ensuring civil society representation in decision-making platforms, equipping civil society organisations with resources needed to support public health responses and jointly setting specific and measurable goals for civil society partnerships. Introduction Civil society organisations (CSOs)—a diverse set of non-governmental, advocacy and community-based groups1—have historically played transformative roles in advancing health equity. In perhaps the best-known example, CSO campaigns, policy advocacy and scientific partnerships have proven crucial in accelerating the development and global accessibility of treatments for HIV, altering the course of HIV infection programmes and contributing to millions of lives being saved.2 As public health researchers and advocates focused on infectious diseases in Uganda, we have seen how ongoing action from CSOs—such as The AIDS Support Organization, which cares for 100 000 Ugandans living with HIV while leading additional testing, counselling and public awareness efforts3—has brought the country within the reach of achieving the UNAIDS 95-95-95 targets.4 Thanks to their established relationships with constituents and proximate understandings of local realities, CSOs are uniquely positioned to mobilise communities behind evidence-based public health recommendations, including in settings where more distal governmental and academic institutions may struggle to make an impact.5 6 Despite the potential benefits and history of success, governments, local authorities, donors and international development organisations often do not meaningfully involve civil society in initial responses to disease outbreaks.7 8 This missed opportunity for advancing health equity has been sharply illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Early in the pandemic, Rajan et al analysed national COVID-19 task forces and found, among other deficiencies, that CSOs were ‘hardly involved in national government decision-making nor its response efforts’.9 An Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report 2 years later concluded ‘few, and in most cases no, participatory mechanisms were established for discussion and decision-making’ between CSOs and other COVID-19 stakeholders.10 Lack of meaningful engagement with CSOs weakens public health, decreasing the ability of authorities to anticipate and respond to delivery challenges and sidelining organisations with established community trust.8 Finding a gap in civil society involvement in the COVID-19 response in Uganda, in September 2021, we formed the Vaccine Advocacy Accelerator—Uganda (VAX-Uganda): a coalition of CSOs, health workers and academics working to increase access to and uptake of COVID-19 vaccination throughout Uganda, where, at the time, less than 1% of the population had completed a primary vaccination series.11 Inspired by the impact of Ugandan CSOs on the HIV pandemic, we aimed to equip Ugandan CSOs with funding and training to similarly support community-level COVID-19 responses and facilitate knowledge exchange between community-based CSOs, academic partners and national and international stakeholders. Here, we share experience from the first 21 months of the VAX-Uganda CSO coalition, supplemented with findings from a brief literature review of civil society involvement in public health initiatives with an emphasis on resource-limited settings. We offer a framework and some pragmatic lessons on engaging civil society to advance COVID-19 vaccine equity which are also applicable to other emerging and long-standing health threats. Creating a COVID-19 vaccination civil society coalition VAX-Uganda was conceptualised by the Coalition for Health Promotion and Social Development (HEPS-Uganda), a Ugandan CSO advocating for various health and human rights causes, and the Global Health Collaborative, an academic partnership between Mbarara University of Science and Technology (in Uganda) and Massachusetts General Hospital (in the USA) overseeing multiple research, clinical and educational initiatives in Uganda. HEPS-Uganda, with decades of experience organising around access to essential medicines, agreed to mobilise other Ugandan CSOs into a new civil society coalition focused on advancing COVID-19 vaccination. The Global Health Collaborative, which had supported COVID-19 treatment and vaccination efforts in western Uganda since the start of the pandemic, would serve as a scientific resource for the VAX-Uganda coalition, ensuring CSO-led activities and demands were in line with the most up-to-date evidence around the disease. VAX-Uganda first mapped out CSOs across Uganda interested in advancing COVID-19 vaccination and inquired about challenges limiting their involvement. The mapping exercise revealed widespread interest in supporting vaccine equity efforts, but many organisations lacked prior experience working with vaccine-specific causes and the necessary funding to engage in meaningful advocacy. The coalition worked to address these gaps: securing grants from a US-based philanthropic organisation to finance a multiyear CSO-led COVID-19 response, and organising a 4-day workshop in April 2022 reviewing basic vaccine science for 40 CSOs. The workshop featured multiple invited speakers from the Ministry of Health, who reviewed the state of COVID-19 vaccination in Uganda and its challenges, to spark dialogue and future opportunities for COVID-19-focused collaboration between CSOs and the government. Roles for civil society in outbreak response Following the April 2022 workshop, the number of CSOs in the VAX-Uganda coalition has increased to 60, representing organisations with expertise in health activism (particularly related to HIV), health communications, intellectual property rights and other areas, all committed to responding to COVID-19 in Uganda. Members of the coalition and other partner CSOs have supported equitable access to vaccinations in three key, replicable ways: community mobilisation and empowerment, service delivery and advocacy (table 1). Table 1 Framework for civil society involvement in response to infectious disease outbreaks Major areas of civil society contributions during infectious outbreaks Examples of civil society activities during past outbreaks Examples of Ugandan civil society activities during the COVID-19 pandemic 1. Community mobilisation and empowerment CSO volunteers in Nigeria used community dialogues and house-to-house mobilisation to build community trust in a polio programme, leading to 73% of local caregivers identifying the volunteer mobilisers as their primary source of polio information.12 During the 2015 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, the SEND Foundation of West Africa assembled community health workers, faith-based groups, women’s groups and others to provide medical supplies, particularly to hard-to-reach areas.13 HEPS-Uganda convened 24 town hall discussions across Uganda in 2022 to hear community concerns, provide education and fight disinformation about COVID-19 vaccine safety.VAX-Uganda CSOs shared ideas with Ugandan government ministries on how to most effectively engage parents and schools during a COVID-19 vaccination campaign for schoolchildren. 2. Service delivery The AIDS Support Organization in Uganda cares for 100 000 people living with HIV and offers testing and counselling services.3 The Botswana Retired Nurses Society provided comprehensive, palliative and home-based treatment for individuals living with HIV, reaching underserved communities in need.3 BRAC Bangladesh coordinated community health workers who offered directly observed therapy for tuberculosis and connected patients with health providers.14 The Uganda Red Cross Society provided volunteers for understaffed vaccination sites in five districts in western Uganda. 3. Advocacy CSO campaigns and policy advocacy accelerated the development and global accessibility of antiretroviral drugs for HIV.2 An El Salvadoran CSO brought a case of reproductive rights violation to the state constitutional court, defending a 17-year-old living with HIV who experienced forced sterilisation after giving birth.15 VAX-Uganda CSOs influenced the inclusion of COVID-19 diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics in the 2022 Uganda Clinical Guidelines and Essential Medicines and Health Supplies List of Uganda.Following a request from VAX-Uganda CSOs, the Ministry of Health’s Director of Public Health published clear public guidance on heterologous COVID-19 vaccination schedules and instructed radio stations to stop playing outdated messages about the practice. CSO, civil society organisation; HEPS-Uganda, Coalition for Health Promotion and Social Development; VAX-Uganda, The Vaccine Advocacy Accelerator—Uganda. Community mobilisation and empowerment Ugandan CSOs have spearheaded efforts to educate and mobilise communities around COVID-19 vaccination. For example, with VAX-Uganda’s support, HEPS-Uganda hosted 24 town hall discussions across the country in 2022 to address questions and concerns about COVID-19 vaccination, an essential intervention for improving local trust in vaccination. These discussions, led by HEPS-Uganda staff with experience moderating similar community events, involved presentations on the science and safety behind COVID-19 vaccines, as well as on local and global challenges influencing vaccine access and potential solutions to these. Many participants highlighted their willingness to follow HEPS-Uganda’s guidance given the organisation’s decades of providing accurate information about HIV in the same locations. In an effort to reach additional audiences with the same messages, staff from HEPS-Uganda also participated in multiple television talk shows and Twitter spaces encouraging people to get vaccinated. CSOs have also supported the COVID-19 community mobilisation activities of other public health institutions. In August 2022, for example, our coalition organised a meeting between CSOs and multiple Ugandan government branches—including the Ministries of Health, Finance, and Education and Sports—on improving coordination of COVID-19 responses led by these partners. Participating CSOs shared verbal feedback and written guidance on how the ministries could best work with parents and schools to launch a successful COVID-19 vaccination campaign among schoolchildren. Although Uganda’s outbreak of Ebola virus disease in late 2022 shifted national attention away from COVID-19, the continuous rapport between VAX-Uganda CSOs and government officials, stemming from these earlier consultations, allowed for some COVID-19 vaccination mobilisation activities to continue even as the country worked to contain a simultaneous infectious threat. In multiple prior outbreaks, CSOs have similarly mobilised communities to aid in health equity efforts, with several examples provided in table 1.12 13 Service delivery Service delivery is a crucial sphere of civil society activities, as evidenced by efforts against HIV and tuberculosis (table 1),3 14 and Ugandan CSOs have acted similarly to support COVID-19 vaccine delivery. After receiving basic training from the Ministry of Health, which provided background on COVID-19 vaccine science and on the national COVID-19 vaccination registration system, the Uganda Red Cross Society deployed volunteers to support understaffed COVID-19 vaccination teams in five districts in western Uganda. These volunteers helped to keep vaccination centres functional by registering patients, managing queues sometimes filled with hundreds of people and answering questions that overwhelmed health workers may not have had time to address. When local demand for vaccination surged to even higher levels, the Uganda Red Cross Society responded by having existing volunteers train new volunteers, increasing the number of people who were able to assist at vaccination sites. Advocacy Building on its established history of using influence for advocacy and human rights (table 1),2 13 15 civil society has played a central role throughout the pandemic in demanding an end to COVID-19-related inequities. Ugandan CSOs in the VAX-Uganda coalition—in addition to CSOs around the world and US-based partners in the coalition—have used open letters, public demonstrations and other strategies to raise public awareness of ‘vaccine nationalism’ and convince wealthy nations, pharmaceutical companies and others to make COVID-19 vaccines more available in low-income settings.16–21 One such open letter, signed by 32 VAX-Uganda CSOs in response to concerns around the accurate reporting of vaccination rates, resulted in CSOs being invited to join weekly COVID-19 Incident Management Team meetings in Uganda, a standing platform to share feedback with the Ministry of Health, US Agency for International Development and other institutions involved with the national COVID-19 vaccination campaign. Similarly, CSO revisions to the 2022 Uganda Clinical Guidelines and Essential Medicines and Health Supplies List of Uganda—feedback which was invited by the Ministry of Health—influenced the ultimate inclusion of COVID-19 diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics in both policy documents, a crucial step toward improving their availability around the country. Advocacy can also take the form of simple but firm requests to duty-bearers. During an April 2022 meeting organised by VAX-Uganda between 40 Ugandan CSOs and the Ministry of Health’s Director of Public Health, civil society representatives identified widespread confusion in their respective communities around heterologous COVID-19 vaccination schedules: receiving a different COVID-19 vaccine brand for one’s second versus first vaccination dose. CSO representatives asked the Director to publish clear public guidance on heterologous vaccination and instruct radio stations to stop playing outdated messages recommending against the practice; he immediately carried out both requests. Recommendations In the wake of COVID-19 and other recent outbreaks of infectious diseases, public health stakeholders often talk about the role of CSOs in outbreak response.10 22 Unfortunately, resource holders often fail to give CSOs the platforms and resources needed to enact the health equity work they are acknowledged to be able to do.23 Lessons learnt from VAX-Uganda may help to avoid these pitfalls, creating more genuine outbreak-focused partnerships that better capitalise on civil society’s unique strengths. Ensure civil society representation in decision-making platforms Governments, aid agencies and other institutions should work to include CSOs in discussions around the design, implementation and evaluation of public health programmes and research. VAX-Uganda demonstrates how giving civil society a ‘seat at the table’ allows initiatives to benefit from CSOs’ community-level insights. Importantly, other stakeholders should be mindful of avoiding meetings that performatively have CSOs as attendees—allowing organisers to claim civil society has been represented—but fail to produce concrete commitments or empower CSOs to take on new responsibilities.10 We recommend including CSOs in decision-making platforms at baseline, and not just during active outbreaks of infectious disease, so that existing partnerships can be relied on whenever health emergencies arise. Equip civil society with resources needed to support outbreak responses As we were reminded during VAX-Uganda’s initial mapping exercise, public health collaborations that hope to involve CSOs should also have a plan for identifying and meeting their needs. Our experience highlights multiple forms of resources that governments, academia and others can provide for CSOs: funding to organise public health activities, connections to advocacy platforms, such as media interviews and testimony invitations, and training on the science underlying vaccines and other life-saving interventions. Set specific and measurable goals with civil society partners The nature of VAX-Uganda, featuring a series of diverse activities implemented alongside multiple concurrent public awareness campaigns and supply chain improvements, makes numerically quantifying the contribution of our coalition to Uganda’s COVID-19 vaccination rates very challenging especially considering the urgency in which the programme was implemented for action rather than as a research study. However, having concrete targets for each CSO-centric objective—for example, the number of CSO-led advocacy events to be organised in a year—has nonetheless kept meaningful coalition activities on track and reaffirmed a shift away from meetings that are more performative than active engagement. By jointly setting specific and measurable goals with CSO colleagues, public health authorities can reduce ambiguity around these collaborations—what does civil society ‘engagement’ mean in practice?—and better evaluate which aspects of the partnership can be improved. Alongside the collection of goal-related metrics, future studies can be designed to quantitatively measure the impact of CSO collaborations on infectious disease outbreaks and other health challenges. Conclusion Strengthening civil society collaborations requires significant effort. The experiences of coalitions that arose out of the COVID-19 outbreak, such as VAX-Uganda, demonstrate the important roles CSOs can play in advancing health for all during a public health crisis. As we move forward and face future infectious disease threats, CSOs can be an essential component of a successful response especially when governments, donors and others assign effort and resources to include them, ideally before emergencies arise.

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          Governance of the Covid-19 response: a call for more inclusive and transparent decision-making

          Summary box Not all countries make their Covid-19 task force membership list public—the available information varies by country. There is currently a predominance of politicians, virologists and epidemiologists in the Covid-19 response at the country level. Experts on non-Covid-19 health, social and societal consequences of Covid-19 response measures are, for the most part, not included in Covid-19 decision-making bodies. There is little transparency regarding whom decision-making bodies are consulting as their source of advice and information. From the available data on Covid-19 decision-making entities, female representation is particularly paltry. In addition, civil society is hardly involved in national government decision-making nor its response efforts, barring some exceptions. We need to be more inclusive and multidisciplinary: the Covid-19 crisis is not simply a health problem but a societal one—it impacts every single person in society one way or another. Decision makers need to address more systematically the suffering from mental illness exacerbations, domestic violence, child abuse, child development delays, chronic diseases and so on, during lockdown. Introduction As SARS-COV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2) ravages the globe, heads of state are making swift decisions to put large swathes of the world’s population under mass isolation in the race to heed off Covid-19’s lethality, particularly in certain population subgroups. How are these decisions—that affect each and every one of us, some groups disproportionately and regardless of Covid-19 status—made? How far have policy makers and politicians consulted those who have experience and expertise on the secondary effects of lockdowns, social isolation measures and movement restrictions? We attempted to address these questions with a rapid analysis of 24 countries’ Covid-19 task force compositions. The countries were selected to represent a range of geographies and income levels. As far as possible, we focused on governance bodies set up or activated to give scientific, or evidence-based, advice to national decision makers. In some countries, the advisory and decision-making bodies were one and the same, often taking the form of government-only interministerial committees. We excluded committees which were established to focus on a specific area, for example, research related to vaccination; rather, we examined committees whose explicit mandate (based on available information) was to provide advisory guidance on the overall national response. We scanned publicly available documentation from government websites, media articles, and in specific cases, contacted our networks in governments and health ministries for official documentation. We then researched the task force members’ backgrounds and triangulated from different sources to classify them based on their current professional role or area of specialisation. Experts were thus categorised based on the principal reason for their appointment to the task force. For example, a physician with a current public health role would be classified as a public health specialist and not a clinician, the assumption being that their current role is most relevant for the task force. The ‘government’ or ‘Ministry of Health’ category was allocated to career civil servants, that is, posts which are usually filled by generalists rather than specialists. Most other task force members, including public health institute staff, were categorised according to their expertise since the rationale for their task force membership is their specific skill set (mathematical modeller, virologist, etc) rather than their institutional affiliation. At least two coauthors independently categorised the task force members and crosschecked categorisations with each other. How inclusive and transparent is Covid-19 decicion-making? We highlight a number of key issues, some very worrying, made evident by table 1: Table 1 Covid-19 task forces set up to advise national governments Country Name of task force convened or activated for Covid-19 response Composition of task force by member expertise Gender distribution Argentina28 Expert Committee (El comité de expertos) 5 Government officials 2 Ministry of Health officials 6 Infectious disease specialists 1 Epidemiologist 1 Public health specialist 12 M; 3 F Belgium29 30 Scientific Committee Coronavirus (Comité scientifique Coronavirus) 3 Infectious disease specialists 1 Epidemiologist 1 Laboratory specialist 2 M; 3 F Burkina Faso31 Name unknown 1 Ministry of Health official 4 Infectious disease specialists 2 Epidemiologists 3 Public health specialists 2 Other medical specialists 1 Communication specialist 1 Private sector 4 Unknown 14 M; 5 F Chad32 Scientific Committee for Covid-19(Comité Scientifique Covid-19) 1 Ministry of Health official 7 Infectious disease specialists 1 Epidemiologist 1 Laboratory specialist 8 Public health specialists 2 Intensive Care specialists 12 Other medical specialists 1 Pharmacist 1 Nutrition specialist 1 Lawyer 1 Socioanthropologist 1 Historian 33 M; 4 F Chile33 Advisory Board of Ministry of Health for Covid-19(Consejo Asesor del MINSAL por Covid-19) 2 Ministry of Health officials 1 Infectious disease specialist 3 Public health specialists 1 Other medical specialist 3 M; 4 F China34 35 Central Leading Group on Responding to the Novel Coronavirus Disease Outbreak 9 Government officials 8 M; 1 F France36–39 Scientific council Covid-19(Conseil scientifique Covid-19) 4 Infectious disease specialists 1 Epidemiologist 1 Mathematical modelling specialist 1 Intensive Care specialist 1 Other medical specialist 1 Anthropologist 1 Sociologist 8 M; 2 F Analysis, research and expertise committee(Comité analyse, recherche et expertise (CARE)) 6 Infectious disease specialists 1 Mathematical modelling specialist 2 Laboratory specialists 2 Other medical specialists 1 Anthropologist 7 M; 5 F Germany40–42 Interministerial crisis unit(Krisenstab) Government officials from six different ministries Unknown Guinea43 44 Scientific council on pandemic response to coronavirus disease (Covid-19)(Conseil scientifique de riposte contre la pandémie de la maladie à coronavirus (Covid-19)) 2 Infectious disease specialists 1 Epidemiologist 1 Laboratory specialist 3 Public health specialists 3 Pharmacists 3 Other medical specialists 1 Psychologist 1 Economist 2 Socioanthropologist 14 M; 3 F Haiti45 Scientific committee to combat coronavirus(Cellule scientifique pour lutter contre le coronavirus) 1 Ministry of Health official 2 Infectious disease specialists 1 Epidemiologist 1 Laboratory specialist 2 Public health specialists 1 Intensive Care specialist 3 Other medical specialists 1 Mental health specialist 1 Sociologist 1 Civil society 12 M; 2 F Hungary46 Coronaviral Defence Operational Staff(Koronavírus-járvány Elleni Védekezésért Felelős Operatív Törzs) 11 Government officials 3 Ministry of Health officials 1 Infectious disease specialist 14 M; 1 F Italy47–49 Operational Committee on Coronavirus for Civil Protection(Comitato operativo sul Coronavirus alla Protezione Civile) 6 Government officials 1 Ministry of Health official 7 M; 0 F Scientific Technical Committee(Comitato Tecnico Scientifico) 4 Ministry of Health officials 2 Infectious disease specialists 1 Public health specialist 7 M; 0 F Task force tech anti Covid-19 2 Government officials 2 Ministry of Health officials 2 Infectious disease specialists 5 Epidemiologists 1 Mathematician 4 Public health specialists 1 Social scientist 12 Data management specialists 4 Statisticians 1 Physicist 1 Civil engineering expert 1 Digital health expert 1 Chemist 1 Information systems expert 13 Economists 3 Computer science experts 1 Communication technology expert 3 Digital transformation experts 2 Emergency management experts 11 Lawyers 1 Unknown 56 M; 18 F Kenya50 51 National Emergency Response Committee 17 Government officials 4 Ministry of Health officials 15 M; 6 F Mali52 53 Crisis Committee(Le Comité de crise) 2 Governmental officials 2 Ministry of Health officials 1 Infectious disease specialist 2 Laboratory specialists 4 Public health specialists 1 Other medical specialist 12 M; 0 F Scientific and Technical Committee of the National Public Health Institute(Comité Scientifique et Technique de l’Institut National de Santé Publique -INSP) 5 Infectious disease specialists 1 Public health specialist 1 Other medical specialist 1 Agronomist 1 Ecologist 1 Nutritionist 9 M; 1 F Philippines54 Inter-Agency task force 2 Government officials 2 Ministry of Health officials 4 M; 0 F National task force Covid-1919 (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council - NDRRMC) 4 Government officials 4 M; 0 F Portugal55 56 Task force Covid-19 13 Infectious disease specialists 10 Epidemiologists 12 Public health specialists 1 Intensive Care specialist 5 Other medical specialists 1 Chemist 2 Communication specialists 25 Unknown 26 M; 42 F National Public Health Council(Conselho Nacional de Saúde Pública) 2 Government officials 2 Ministry of Health Officials 5 Infectious disease specialists 1 Epidemiologist 2 Public health specialists 1 Other medical specialist 1 Pharmacist 2 Lawyers 1 Private sector 2 CSO 14 M; 6 F Singapore57 Multi-Ministry Taskforce on Wuhan Coronavirus 10 Government officials 1 Ministry of Health official 10 M; 1 F South Korea58 59 Central Disease Control Headquarters (KCDC) Led by Jung Eun-Kyeong (Director) Other members unknown 1 F, unknown Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters Led by the Prime Minister (Chung Sye-kyun) Other members unknown 1 M, unknown Central Incidence Management System for Novel Coronavirus Infection Led by Minister of Health and Welfare (Park Neung-hoo) Other members unknown 1 M, unknown Central Disaster Management Headquarters Led by Ministry of Health and Welfare (Park Neung-hoo) Other members unknown 1 M, unknown Government-wide Support Centre Led by Minister of Public Administration and Security Other members unknown 1 M, unknown Local Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters (local municipal governments nationwide) Led by the head of the local government Other members unknown Unknown Local quarantine task force (local municipal governments nationwide) Led by the head of the local government Other members unknown Unknown Spain60 Scientific Technical Committee Covid-19(Comité Cientifico Técnico Covid-19 19) 3 Infectious disease specialists 3 Epidemiologists 3 M; 3 F Switzerland61 Science Task Force 6 Infectious disease specialists 2 Epidemiologists 1 Mathematical modelling specialist 1 Laboratory specialist 2 Public health specialists 1 Environmental engineering expert 1 Computer science expert 1 Economist 1 Bioethics expert 12 M; 4 F Thailand62 National committee for controlling the spread of Covid-19 26 Government officials 2 Ministry of Health officials 28 M; 0 F Vietnam63 Committee for Covid-19 Prevention and Control(Tiểu ban giám sát phòng, chống dịch bệnh Covid-19). 5 Government officials 9 Ministry of Health officials 13 M; 1 F United Kingdom64–66 New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG) 9 Infectious diseases specialists 1 Epidemiologists 2 Mathematical modelling specialists 1 Public health specialist 1 Intensive Care specialist 1 Sociologist 1 Psychologist 14 M; 2 F Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) 1 Government official 12 Infectious disease specialists 1 Mathematical modelling specialist 1 Public health specialist 1 Other medical specialist 13 M; 3 F Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) 19 Infectious disease specialists 1 Other medical specialist 1 Lay member (unknown) 12 M; 9 F USA67 68 White House Coronavirus Task Force 19 Government officials 1 Ministry of Health official 3 Infectious disease specialists 21 M; 2 F 1.‘Evidence’ seems to be largely understood to mean research-based evidence, and not necessarily experiential, implementation-based evidence from the field The vast majority of Covid-19 response task force members are from reputed universities and government institutes where rigorous research is conducted in the classical sense, often under clinical trial or laboratory conditions. Information and evidence on the lived experiences and everyday challenges faced by the various groups in society who are (at times, severely) affected by isolation measures seem to be altogether overlooked in the urgency of the current situation. 2. Among researchers, mainly virologists and epidemiologists seem to be consulted, leaving out other health and also non-health experts Most countries acknowledge the need for government to work jointly with the medical (and public health) community in the national Covid-19 response. However, mainly virologists and epidemiologists seem to be consulted, largely leaving out specialists in areas such as mental health, child health, chronic diseases, preventive medicine, gerontology, not to mention experts in non-health spheres. Social isolation measures have enormous secondary effects1 beyond the primary aim of curbing viral spread. These effects go far beyond health (discussed below). But even within the health space, the consequences of not accessing, or inadequately accessing,2 basic essential services for a wide range of non-Covid-19-related conditions3 do not seem to have been sufficiently considered. 3. When the task force is government-only, more non-health sectors seem to be represented, but at the detriment of non-government expertise Still, some countries’ Covid-19 task forces are government-only. In those cases, there at least seems to be a stronger presence of non-health sectors, although to the detriment of non-government expertise. In a number of countries, Covid-19 task forces consist of high-level government cadres only, combining the advisory and decision-making elements into one. Medical and epidemiological expertise seems to come from government health institutions, but it is not always clear who is being consulted beyond government. A multiministry task force at least theoretically brings in concerns from other sectors such as education,4 economy, interior, and so on, potentially raising serious issues in terms of, for example, child development5 (relevant to decisions on school closures, for example),6 loss of livelihoods7 (particularly relevant in low-income countries8 and those with large social inequalities and no social safety net), and further marginalisation of migrants9 and illegal workers (who often have nowhere to isolate to). However, how far those concerns are actually taken into consideration is impossible to discern without more transparency with regard to the content of deliberations and potential consultations with external parties. 4. Civil society and community groups do not seem to be consulted at all In addition to civil society and community groups not being engaged in primary discussions, neither are social workers, child development specialists, human rights lawyers, and many other people whose experiential and vocational expertise are particularly relevant in terms of societal rights, and groups affected by isolation measures. The WHO weekly Covid-19 situation update from 15 April mentions that only 36% of member states reported having a Covid-19 community engagement plan.10 In addition, a majority of the 175 civil society respondents from 56 countries confirmed in a recent rapid survey of the UHC2030 Alliance’s Civil Society Engagement Mechanism that most of their Covid-19 response work was, indeed, independent of the government. Results and methodology of the survey can be found here. Vulnerable groups11 such as the disabled,12 those with serious mental health conditions,13 single mothers,14 people in abusive family relationships15 and the elderly16 bear the burden of the negative consequences of isolation and loneliness, potentially threatening the social fabric of society. Civil society organisations, community groups, social workers, nurse-caregivers and many other groups are at the front lines with this broad cross-section of society clearly affected by the far-reaching effects of mass isolation. Civil society can also raise awareness on existing social inequalities which are usually exacerbated in crisis situations, leaving many to feel that ‘self-isolation is a privilege for the rich’.17–20 If there is one thing that we should learn from another virus-based crisis (HIV), it is that the population, communities and civil society are an integral part of the crisis solution.21 5. Women are a minority in Covid-19 task forces, and are not represented at all in some The Women in Global Health movement has already lamented the abysmally low proportion of women represented in global Covid-19 response efforts.22 Besides some notable exceptions, the same low percentages of female experts are seen across the national task forces we rapidly reviewed, with some task forces even being all male. Women’s perspectives and expertise clearly seem to be heard less often than male colleagues, even while the majority of front-line health staff fighting the crisis is female.23 6. More transparency is needed on who is taking decisions and how We took great pains to scan a broad variety of websites, newspapers and government documents in several languages within a short amount of time. Still, information on (1) Who is making far-reaching decisions on an unprecedented global and national crisis? (2) How decision makers are reaching their conclusions (ie, who else are they reaching out to for advice)? (3) Which exact positions advisers had? was not always easy to come by. There are signs that some countries’ governments and/or Covid-19 task forces are indeed consulting with outside parties24 relevant to the secondary consequences of long-term isolation25 but this information is generally not clear and transparent. In addition, transparency on selection criteria for the task forces themselves is needed to better understand the weight given to the different aspects of the outbreak. Conclusion We acknowledge that the information may not be complete, nor completely up to date, given the extremely fast-paced dynamic of the Covid-19 outbreak as well as response measures. We also recognise that Covid-19 task force compositions are not the sole indication of whose voices are included in decision-making. Through the fairly broad range of (mostly) publicly available information analysed, we attempted to understand which groups the task forces were reaching out to within the scope of a rapid analysis. In general, protocols, reports, minutes of task force meetings and lists of externally consulted parties were simply not easily available. Nevertheless, we feel that the broad conclusions we take based on our rapid (but imperfect) analysis still hold based on the information we were able to access. The table above displays the list of countries and their available task force information. Governments must recognise the multidimensional effects and needs of society26 during this Covid-19 crisis and consult more broadly and across disciplines, within health and beyond health, based on a true multisectoral paradigm. More importantly, more transparency is needed regarding who decision-making bodies are listening to as a basis for their decisions. Now more than ever, the voices of those who are at risk of getting left behind need to be heard.27 In the end, we must ensure that we do not do more harm than good with the measures in place to protect our at-risk populations.
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            COVID-19: Global Health Equity in Pandemic Response

            As the world struggles with the rapidly evolving pandemic of novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), evidence and experience suggest that low-income and marginalized communities in our global society will bear the biggest impact. We know this because, with our colleagues in Boston, Haiti, Uganda, and Sierra Leone, we have worked in under-resourced, overstretched, and overwhelmed health systems for our whole careers. We know we will see the devastating impact of this pandemic on those who are already marginalized; COVID-19 will amplify existing inequities, and we must act swiftly to leave no one behind. Diagnostics, pharmaceutical interventions, and public health solutions for other pandemic diseases such as tuberculosis, HIV infection, and cholera have never fully “trickled down” to marginalized or impoverished communities. That is why, for example, HIV infection rates remain alarmingly high among adolescent girls in South Africa, 1 and transgender people and communities of color in the United States, 2 and why tuberculosis still remains a major public health concern despite the advent of effective therapy for drug-sensitive disease almost 50 years ago. 3 As the world races to find an effective antiviral against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2, as well as a vaccine, will these become sovereign commodities of the global North? We see no reason why injustices of the past will not be repeated just because the pathogen is novel. Often, widespread access to lifesaving therapeutics—like treatment for HIV infection—has only been made possible for marginalized groups through hard-fought activism. But activism alone is not enough—in 2019, the U.S. government declined influenza vaccinations to detainees of the Customs and Border Protection agency despite documented deaths of children in these detention facilities from influenza and protests by medical professionals. 4 As the incidence of COVID-19 escalates in low-income countries, we have five specific concerns as global health faculty at large U.S. teaching hospitals. First, it is well documented that structural and institutional racism, and the marginalization of migrant communities, perpetuate differential outcomes in health. Poor or otherwise marginalized communities, including communities of color, have been systematically left behind as biomedical progress advances. Existing health disparities, such as disparities in the prevalence of pulmonary disease, highlight worrisome risk factors for increased incidence of COVID-19. Asthma rates are higher among U.S. black and native American children than U.S. white children, and asthma is most prevalent in the poorest socioeconomic groups. 5 Tobacco companies, after spending decades enticing the use of their products in low-resourced settings, have acquired 1.1 billion customers who smoke, of whom 80% reside in low- and middle-income countries. 6 Long-term consequences of smoking, such as chronic lung disease, have already been linked to worse COVID-19 outcomes. As of this date, in mid-April 2020, most confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been in Europe, East Asia, and the United States, places where noncommunicable diseases predominate the health landscape. We know very little about how malnutrition, tuberculosis, HIV infection, and soil-transmitted helminth infections will impact the disease course of COVID-19, but these could have major implications for low-resourced communities in which the prevalence of these diseases is high. Second, although almost every health system’s capacity would be surpassed by an unmitigated surge in COVID-19 cases, fragile health systems in low-income settings struggle daily to diagnose and treat even moderately unwell people because of chronic shortages of trained staff, effective therapeutics, diagnostics, and built infrastructure. Global inequity in maternal mortality, under-5 diarrheal mortality, and deaths from pneumonia all highlight this fact. Already, around the world, there are countless unnecessary deaths on a daily basis—“senseless deaths” that never needed to happen because we know what to do. We have just failed to deliver. Material deprivations in the built health environment are pervasive, and personal protective equipment to care for patients with transmissible diseases are already in desperately low supply in many countries. Laboratory capacity is often limited by a lack of staff and supplies, and laboratories are frequently centralized in urban regions, leaving rural places without access. Low testing rates for COVID-19 in countries such as Haiti, Yemen, and Central African Republic emphasize already how challenging it will be to even understand the pandemic without accessible diagnostics; never mind trace and isolate those people with infection for effective control. Although the year 2020 opened with a celebration of the international year of the nurse and midwife, the WHO’s most recent data estimated a global deficit of 17.4 million health workers, mainly in Africa and Southeast Asia. 7 Although our own hospitals in Boston scramble to create rosters with three or four layers of staffing backup to cope with forecasted numbers of sick or exposed staff and patient flow, how will communities with a drastically insufficient health workforce at baseline cope? Third, in many circumstances, it is impossible to quarantine at home or to self-isolate. Homeless people, displaced populations, and prisoners cannot choose to be physically distant from others. Haiti, where we have worked for almost two decades, is one of the most densely populated countries in the Latin America Caribbean region, with whole families often living in humble one- or two-room abodes. Social distancing, one key part of aggressive containment strategies, is not feasible for large swathes of the world, and advisories to stay at home ignore the realities of some of the 820 million food insecure people in the world, for whom the day’s food is acquired only at the end of the day’s work. Food insecurity has a detrimental impact on health which is why, for example, in the midst of a major epidemic in Haiti in 2012, cholera was almost twice as deadly for families that were severely food insecure than for families with steady access to food. 8 Fourth, water insecurity and lack of access to safe sanitation and hygiene will undermine a basic pillar of COVID-19 prevention in many parts of the world. Twenty-nine percent of the global population lacks safely managed drinking water, and three billion people do not have access to soap or water for handwashing at home. 9 The United States offers no exception, as the prevalence of exposure to hookworm in a rural Alabama community and the failure to realize the right to clean water in Flint, Michigan, both demonstrate. 10,11 Fifth, although the direct impact of COVID-19 is self-evident, the indirect impact of the pandemic on other health indicators may be less visible. Fragile health systems that are already stretched have little to no elasticity in supply and are at risk for the biggest impacts of these indirect effects. The 2014 Ebola virus disease epidemic in West Africa, for example, resulted in more than 4,000 maternal deaths, 6,700 infant mortalities, and approximately 3.5 million more cases of untreated malaria because the health system effort was, by necessity, redirected to the viral epidemic response. 12 What does global health equity mean in a pandemic of such magnitude as COVID-19? It means we must take a proactive approach, addressing disparities and injustice from the start—both in how we approach scientific discovery and in how we deliver interventions. Scientists, practitioners, and community leaders in low-resource communities have innovations, hypotheses, and proposed solutions to the COVID-19 pandemic. The global public health elite must have the humility to include these as part of collective action. We must commit, as a global community, to ensuring that when pharmaceutical interventions are proven, they will be accessible to all, not only those who can afford to pay. We need COVID-19 incidence and mortality data that are disaggregated by gender, race, and location. We need radical social investments to support the most impoverished, and we must decongest prisons and release detained asylum seekers to prevent unnecessary deaths. Multilateral investment in health systems strengthening as a fundamental principle of global health equity has never been more important than now. With an ambitious belief in what it is possible to do for the poorest communities, we must commit to global health equity, leaving no one behind.
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              Civil society: the catalyst for ensuring health in the age of sustainable development

              Sustainable Development Goal Three is rightly ambitious, but achieving it will require doing global health differently. Among other things, progressive civil society organisations will need to be recognised and supported as vital partners in achieving the necessary transformations. We argue, using illustrative examples, that a robust civil society can fulfill eight essential global health functions. These include producing compelling moral arguments for action, building coalitions beyond the health sector, introducing novel policy alternatives, enhancing the legitimacy of global health initiatives and institutions, strengthening systems for health, enhancing accountability systems, mitigating the commercial determinants of health and ensuring rights-based approaches. Given that civil society activism has catalyzed tremendous progress in global health, there is a need to invest in and support it as a global public good to ensure that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development can be realised.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                BMJ Glob Health
                BMJ Glob Health
                bmjgh
                bmjgh
                BMJ Global Health
                BMJ Publishing Group (BMA House, Tavistock Square, London, WC1H 9JR )
                2059-7908
                2023
                30 June 2023
                30 June 2023
                : 8
                : 6
                : e012510
                Affiliations
                [1 ]departmentDepartment of Medicine , Ringgold_2348Massachusetts General Hospital , Boston, Massachusetts, USA
                [2 ]departmentGlobal Health Collaborative , Ringgold_108123Mbarara University of Science and Technology , Mbarara, Uganda
                [3 ]departmentCenter for Global Health , Ringgold_2348Massachusetts General Hospital , Boston, Massachusetts, USA
                [4 ]Ringgold_275971Harvard Global Health Institute , Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
                [5 ]departmentInfectious Diseases Division , Ringgold_551672Massachusetts General Hospital , Boston, Massachusetts, USA
                [6 ]departmentSpecial Pathogens Unit, Department of Internal Medicine , Mbarara Regional Referral Hospital , Mbarara, Uganda
                [7 ]Coalition for Health Promotion and Social Development (HEPS-Uganda) , Kampala, Uganda
                [8 ]departmentDepartment of Community Health , Ringgold_108123Mbarara University of Science and Technology , Mbarara, Uganda
                Author notes
                [Correspondence to ] Dr Azfar D Hossain; ahossain1@ 123456mgb.org

                ADH and MN are joint first authors.

                SA and LCI are joint senior authors.

                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2808-3808
                http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2314-9230
                Article
                bmjgh-2023-012510
                10.1136/bmjgh-2023-012510
                10314453
                44d073c3-3edc-4670-a285-b7c9b2c49c8e
                © Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.

                This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0) license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made indicated, and the use is non-commercial. See:  http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/.

                History
                : 05 April 2023
                : 05 June 2023
                Funding
                Funded by: FundRef http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100000910, Conrad N. Hilton Foundation;
                Award ID: 27371
                Categories
                Commentary
                1506
                2474
                Custom metadata
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                covid-19,public health,vaccines
                covid-19, public health, vaccines

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