Summary box
Not all countries make their Covid-19 task force membership list public—the available
information varies by country.
There is currently a predominance of politicians, virologists and epidemiologists
in the Covid-19 response at the country level.
Experts on non-Covid-19 health, social and societal consequences of Covid-19 response
measures are, for the most part, not included in Covid-19 decision-making bodies.
There is little transparency regarding whom decision-making bodies are consulting
as their source of advice and information.
From the available data on Covid-19 decision-making entities, female representation
is particularly paltry.
In addition, civil society is hardly involved in national government decision-making
nor its response efforts, barring some exceptions.
We need to be more inclusive and multidisciplinary: the Covid-19 crisis is not simply
a health problem but a societal one—it impacts every single person in society one
way or another.
Decision makers need to address more systematically the suffering from mental illness
exacerbations, domestic violence, child abuse, child development delays, chronic diseases
and so on, during lockdown.
Introduction
As SARS-COV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2) ravages the globe,
heads of state are making swift decisions to put large swathes of the world’s population
under mass isolation in the race to heed off Covid-19’s lethality, particularly in
certain population subgroups. How are these decisions—that affect each and every one
of us, some groups disproportionately and regardless of Covid-19 status—made? How
far have policy makers and politicians consulted those who have experience and expertise
on the secondary effects of lockdowns, social isolation measures and movement restrictions?
We attempted to address these questions with a rapid analysis of 24 countries’ Covid-19
task force compositions. The countries were selected to represent a range of geographies
and income levels. As far as possible, we focused on governance bodies set up or activated
to give scientific, or evidence-based, advice to national decision makers. In some
countries, the advisory and decision-making bodies were one and the same, often taking
the form of government-only interministerial committees. We excluded committees which
were established to focus on a specific area, for example, research related to vaccination;
rather, we examined committees whose explicit mandate (based on available information)
was to provide advisory guidance on the overall national response.
We scanned publicly available documentation from government websites, media articles,
and in specific cases, contacted our networks in governments and health ministries
for official documentation. We then researched the task force members’ backgrounds
and triangulated from different sources to classify them based on their current professional
role or area of specialisation. Experts were thus categorised based on the principal
reason for their appointment to the task force. For example, a physician with a current
public health role would be classified as a public health specialist and not a clinician,
the assumption being that their current role is most relevant for the task force.
The ‘government’ or ‘Ministry of Health’ category was allocated to career civil servants,
that is, posts which are usually filled by generalists rather than specialists. Most
other task force members, including public health institute staff, were categorised
according to their expertise since the rationale for their task force membership is
their specific skill set (mathematical modeller, virologist, etc) rather than their
institutional affiliation.
At least two coauthors independently categorised the task force members and crosschecked
categorisations with each other.
How inclusive and transparent is Covid-19 decicion-making?
We highlight a number of key issues, some very worrying, made evident by table 1:
Table 1
Covid-19 task forces set up to advise national governments
Country
Name of task force convened or activated for Covid-19 response
Composition of task force by member expertise
Gender distribution
Argentina28
Expert Committee (El comité de expertos)
5 Government officials
2 Ministry of Health officials
6 Infectious disease specialists
1 Epidemiologist
1 Public health specialist
12 M; 3 F
Belgium29 30
Scientific Committee Coronavirus (Comité scientifique Coronavirus)
3 Infectious disease specialists
1 Epidemiologist
1 Laboratory specialist
2 M; 3 F
Burkina Faso31
Name unknown
1 Ministry of Health official
4 Infectious disease specialists
2 Epidemiologists
3 Public health specialists
2 Other medical specialists
1 Communication specialist
1 Private sector
4 Unknown
14 M; 5 F
Chad32
Scientific Committee for Covid-19(Comité Scientifique Covid-19)
1 Ministry of Health official
7 Infectious disease specialists
1 Epidemiologist
1 Laboratory specialist
8 Public health specialists
2 Intensive Care specialists
12 Other medical specialists
1 Pharmacist
1 Nutrition specialist
1 Lawyer
1 Socioanthropologist
1 Historian
33 M; 4 F
Chile33
Advisory Board of Ministry of Health for Covid-19(Consejo Asesor del MINSAL por Covid-19)
2 Ministry of Health officials
1 Infectious disease specialist
3 Public health specialists
1 Other medical specialist
3 M; 4 F
China34 35
Central Leading Group on Responding to the Novel Coronavirus Disease Outbreak
9 Government officials
8 M; 1 F
France36–39
Scientific council Covid-19(Conseil scientifique Covid-19)
4 Infectious disease specialists
1 Epidemiologist
1 Mathematical modelling specialist
1 Intensive Care specialist
1 Other medical specialist
1 Anthropologist
1 Sociologist
8 M; 2 F
Analysis, research and expertise committee(Comité analyse, recherche et expertise
(CARE))
6 Infectious disease specialists
1 Mathematical modelling specialist
2 Laboratory specialists
2 Other medical specialists
1 Anthropologist
7 M; 5 F
Germany40–42
Interministerial crisis unit(Krisenstab)
Government officials from six different ministries
Unknown
Guinea43 44
Scientific council on pandemic response to coronavirus disease (Covid-19)(Conseil
scientifique de riposte contre la pandémie de la maladie à coronavirus (Covid-19))
2 Infectious disease specialists
1 Epidemiologist
1 Laboratory specialist
3 Public health specialists
3 Pharmacists
3 Other medical specialists
1 Psychologist
1 Economist
2 Socioanthropologist
14 M; 3 F
Haiti45
Scientific committee to combat coronavirus(Cellule scientifique pour lutter contre
le coronavirus)
1 Ministry of Health official
2 Infectious disease specialists
1 Epidemiologist
1 Laboratory specialist
2 Public health specialists
1 Intensive Care specialist
3 Other medical specialists
1 Mental health specialist
1 Sociologist
1 Civil society
12 M; 2 F
Hungary46
Coronaviral Defence Operational Staff(Koronavírus-járvány Elleni Védekezésért Felelős
Operatív Törzs)
11 Government officials
3 Ministry of Health officials
1 Infectious disease specialist
14 M; 1 F
Italy47–49
Operational Committee on Coronavirus for Civil Protection(Comitato operativo sul Coronavirus
alla Protezione Civile)
6 Government officials
1 Ministry of Health official
7 M; 0 F
Scientific Technical Committee(Comitato Tecnico Scientifico)
4 Ministry of Health officials
2 Infectious disease specialists
1 Public health specialist
7 M; 0 F
Task force tech anti Covid-19
2 Government officials
2 Ministry of Health officials
2 Infectious disease specialists
5 Epidemiologists
1 Mathematician
4 Public health specialists
1 Social scientist
12 Data management specialists
4 Statisticians
1 Physicist
1 Civil engineering expert
1 Digital health expert
1 Chemist
1 Information systems expert
13 Economists
3 Computer science experts
1 Communication technology expert
3 Digital transformation experts
2 Emergency management experts
11 Lawyers
1 Unknown
56 M; 18 F
Kenya50 51
National Emergency Response Committee
17 Government officials
4 Ministry of Health officials
15 M; 6 F
Mali52 53
Crisis Committee(Le Comité de crise)
2 Governmental officials
2 Ministry of Health officials
1 Infectious disease specialist
2 Laboratory specialists
4 Public health specialists
1 Other medical specialist
12 M; 0 F
Scientific and Technical Committee of the National Public Health Institute(Comité
Scientifique et Technique de l’Institut National de Santé Publique -INSP)
5 Infectious disease specialists
1 Public health specialist
1 Other medical specialist
1 Agronomist
1 Ecologist
1 Nutritionist
9 M; 1 F
Philippines54
Inter-Agency task force
2 Government officials
2 Ministry of Health officials
4 M; 0 F
National task force Covid-1919 (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
- NDRRMC)
4 Government officials
4 M; 0 F
Portugal55 56
Task force Covid-19
13 Infectious disease specialists
10 Epidemiologists
12 Public health specialists
1 Intensive Care specialist
5 Other medical specialists
1 Chemist
2 Communication specialists
25 Unknown
26 M; 42 F
National Public Health Council(Conselho Nacional de Saúde Pública)
2 Government officials
2 Ministry of Health Officials
5 Infectious disease specialists
1 Epidemiologist
2 Public health specialists
1 Other medical specialist
1 Pharmacist
2 Lawyers
1 Private sector
2 CSO
14 M; 6 F
Singapore57
Multi-Ministry Taskforce on Wuhan Coronavirus
10 Government officials
1 Ministry of Health official
10 M; 1 F
South Korea58 59
Central Disease Control Headquarters (KCDC)
Led by Jung Eun-Kyeong (Director)
Other members unknown
1 F, unknown
Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters
Led by the Prime Minister (Chung Sye-kyun)
Other members unknown
1 M, unknown
Central Incidence Management System for Novel Coronavirus Infection
Led by Minister of Health and Welfare (Park Neung-hoo)
Other members unknown
1 M, unknown
Central Disaster Management Headquarters
Led by Ministry of Health and Welfare (Park Neung-hoo)
Other members unknown
1 M, unknown
Government-wide Support Centre
Led by Minister of Public Administration and Security
Other members unknown
1 M, unknown
Local Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters (local municipal governments
nationwide)
Led by the head of the local government
Other members unknown
Unknown
Local quarantine task force (local municipal governments nationwide)
Led by the head of the local government
Other members unknown
Unknown
Spain60
Scientific Technical Committee Covid-19(Comité Cientifico Técnico Covid-19 19)
3 Infectious disease specialists
3 Epidemiologists
3 M; 3 F
Switzerland61
Science Task Force
6 Infectious disease specialists
2 Epidemiologists
1 Mathematical modelling specialist
1 Laboratory specialist
2 Public health specialists
1 Environmental engineering expert
1 Computer science expert
1 Economist
1 Bioethics expert
12 M; 4 F
Thailand62
National committee for controlling the spread of Covid-19
26 Government officials
2 Ministry of Health officials
28 M; 0 F
Vietnam63
Committee for Covid-19 Prevention and Control(Tiểu ban giám sát phòng, chống dịch
bệnh Covid-19).
5 Government officials
9 Ministry of Health officials
13 M; 1 F
United Kingdom64–66
New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG)
9 Infectious diseases specialists
1 Epidemiologists
2 Mathematical modelling specialists
1 Public health specialist
1 Intensive Care specialist
1 Sociologist
1 Psychologist
14 M; 2 F
Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP)
1 Government official
12 Infectious disease specialists
1 Mathematical modelling specialist
1 Public health specialist
1 Other medical specialist
13 M; 3 F
Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI)
19 Infectious disease specialists
1 Other medical specialist
1 Lay member (unknown)
12 M; 9 F
USA67 68
White House Coronavirus Task Force
19 Government officials
1 Ministry of Health official
3 Infectious disease specialists
21 M; 2 F
1.‘Evidence’ seems to be largely understood to mean research-based evidence, and not
necessarily experiential, implementation-based evidence from the field
The vast majority of Covid-19 response task force members are from reputed universities
and government institutes where rigorous research is conducted in the classical sense,
often under clinical trial or laboratory conditions. Information and evidence on the
lived experiences and everyday challenges faced by the various groups in society who
are (at times, severely) affected by isolation measures seem to be altogether overlooked
in the urgency of the current situation.
2. Among researchers, mainly virologists and epidemiologists seem to be consulted,
leaving out other health and also non-health experts
Most countries acknowledge the need for government to work jointly with the medical
(and public health) community in the national Covid-19 response. However, mainly virologists
and epidemiologists seem to be consulted, largely leaving out specialists in areas
such as mental health, child health, chronic diseases, preventive medicine, gerontology,
not to mention experts in non-health spheres.
Social isolation measures have enormous secondary effects1 beyond the primary aim
of curbing viral spread. These effects go far beyond health (discussed below). But
even within the health space, the consequences of not accessing, or inadequately accessing,2
basic essential services for a wide range of non-Covid-19-related conditions3 do not
seem to have been sufficiently considered.
3. When the task force is government-only, more non-health sectors seem to be represented,
but at the detriment of non-government expertise
Still, some countries’ Covid-19 task forces are government-only. In those cases, there
at least seems to be a stronger presence of non-health sectors, although to the detriment
of non-government expertise.
In a number of countries, Covid-19 task forces consist of high-level government cadres
only, combining the advisory and decision-making elements into one. Medical and epidemiological
expertise seems to come from government health institutions, but it is not always
clear who is being consulted beyond government.
A multiministry task force at least theoretically brings in concerns from other sectors
such as education,4 economy, interior, and so on, potentially raising serious issues
in terms of, for example, child development5 (relevant to decisions on school closures,
for example),6 loss of livelihoods7 (particularly relevant in low-income countries8
and those with large social inequalities and no social safety net), and further marginalisation
of migrants9 and illegal workers (who often have nowhere to isolate to). However,
how far those concerns are actually taken into consideration is impossible to discern
without more transparency with regard to the content of deliberations and potential
consultations with external parties.
4. Civil society and community groups do not seem to be consulted at all
In addition to civil society and community groups not being engaged in primary discussions,
neither are social workers, child development specialists, human rights lawyers, and
many other people whose experiential and vocational expertise are particularly relevant
in terms of societal rights, and groups affected by isolation measures. The WHO weekly
Covid-19 situation update from 15 April mentions that only 36% of member states reported
having a Covid-19 community engagement plan.10 In addition, a majority of the 175
civil society respondents from 56 countries confirmed in a recent rapid survey of
the UHC2030 Alliance’s Civil Society Engagement Mechanism that most of their Covid-19
response work was, indeed, independent of the government. Results and methodology
of the survey can be found here.
Vulnerable groups11 such as the disabled,12 those with serious mental health conditions,13
single mothers,14 people in abusive family relationships15 and the elderly16 bear
the burden of the negative consequences of isolation and loneliness, potentially threatening
the social fabric of society. Civil society organisations, community groups, social
workers, nurse-caregivers and many other groups are at the front lines with this broad
cross-section of society clearly affected by the far-reaching effects of mass isolation.
Civil society can also raise awareness on existing social inequalities which are usually
exacerbated in crisis situations, leaving many to feel that ‘self-isolation is a privilege
for the rich’.17–20 If there is one thing that we should learn from another virus-based
crisis (HIV), it is that the population, communities and civil society are an integral
part of the crisis solution.21
5. Women are a minority in Covid-19 task forces, and are not represented at all in
some
The Women in Global Health movement has already lamented the abysmally low proportion
of women represented in global Covid-19 response efforts.22 Besides some notable exceptions,
the same low percentages of female experts are seen across the national task forces
we rapidly reviewed, with some task forces even being all male. Women’s perspectives
and expertise clearly seem to be heard less often than male colleagues, even while
the majority of front-line health staff fighting the crisis is female.23
6. More transparency is needed on who is taking decisions and how
We took great pains to scan a broad variety of websites, newspapers and government
documents in several languages within a short amount of time. Still, information on
(1) Who is making far-reaching decisions on an unprecedented global and national crisis?
(2) How decision makers are reaching their conclusions (ie, who else are they reaching
out to for advice)? (3) Which exact positions advisers had? was not always easy to
come by. There are signs that some countries’ governments and/or Covid-19 task forces
are indeed consulting with outside parties24 relevant to the secondary consequences
of long-term isolation25 but this information is generally not clear and transparent.
In addition, transparency on selection criteria for the task forces themselves is
needed to better understand the weight given to the different aspects of the outbreak.
Conclusion
We acknowledge that the information may not be complete, nor completely up to date,
given the extremely fast-paced dynamic of the Covid-19 outbreak as well as response
measures. We also recognise that Covid-19 task force compositions are not the sole
indication of whose voices are included in decision-making. Through the fairly broad
range of (mostly) publicly available information analysed, we attempted to understand
which groups the task forces were reaching out to within the scope of a rapid analysis.
In general, protocols, reports, minutes of task force meetings and lists of externally
consulted parties were simply not easily available. Nevertheless, we feel that the
broad conclusions we take based on our rapid (but imperfect) analysis still hold based
on the information we were able to access. The table above displays the list of countries
and their available task force information.
Governments must recognise the multidimensional effects and needs of society26 during
this Covid-19 crisis and consult more broadly and across disciplines, within health
and beyond health, based on a true multisectoral paradigm. More importantly, more
transparency is needed regarding who decision-making bodies are listening to as a
basis for their decisions. Now more than ever, the voices of those who are at risk
of getting left behind need to be heard.27 In the end, we must ensure that we do not
do more harm than good with the measures in place to protect our at-risk populations.