Psychological and Educational Testing and Decision-Making: The Lack of Knowledge Dissemination in Textbooks and Test Guidelines

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Author(s): Rob R. Meijer , A. Susan M. Niessen , Marvin Neumann

Publication date (Online): March 16 2023

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

When it comes to decision-making based on psychological and educational assessments, there is compelling evidence that statistical judgment is superior to holistic judgment. Yet, implementing this finding in practice has proven to be difficult for both academic and professional psychologists. Knowledge transfer from research findings to practitioners and other stakeholders in psychological assessment is a necessary condition to close this gap. To obtain insight into how academic specialists in psychological testing disseminate knowledge about research findings in this area, we investigated how textbooks on testing and guidelines on test use report on, or do not to report on, decision-making in psychological and educational assessment. Second, we discuss some commonly encountered misunderstandings, and third we argue for a broader and more in-depth dissemination of research findings on this topic in textbooks and test standards; to this end we provide some suggestions.

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Most cited references 52

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Conditions for intuitive expertise: a failure to disagree.

Daniel Kahneman, Gary Klein (2009)

This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual's opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.

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Clinical versus mechanical prediction: a meta-analysis.

William M. Grove, David H. Zald, Boyd S. Lebow … (2000)

The process of making judgments and decisions requires a method for combining data. To compare the accuracy of clinical and mechanical (formal, statistical) data-combination techniques, we performed a meta-analysis on studies of human health and behavior. On average, mechanical-prediction techniques were about 10% more accurate than clinical predictions. Depending on the specific analysis, mechanical prediction substantially outperformed clinical prediction in 33%-47% of studies examined. Although clinical predictions were often as accurate as mechanical predictions, in only a few studies (6%-16%) were they substantially more accurate. Superiority for mechanical-prediction techniques was consistent, regardless of the judgment task, type of judges, judges' amounts of experience, or the types of data being combined. Clinical predictions performed relatively less well when predictors included clinical interview data. These data indicate that mechanical predictions of human behaviors are equal or superior to clinical prediction methods for a wide range of circumstances.