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      Teleonomy: Revisiting a Proposed Conceptual Replacement for Teleology

      research-article
      1 , , 2 ,
      Biological Theory
      Springer Netherlands
      Adaptation, Evolution, Goal-directedness, Mechanism, Purpose

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          Abstract

          The concept of teleonomy has been attracting renewed attention recently. This is based on the idea that teleonomy provides a useful conceptual replacement for teleology, and even that it constitutes an indispensable resource for thinking biologically about purposes. However, both these claims are open to question. We review the history of teleological thinking from Greek antiquity to the modern period to illuminate the tensions and ambiguities that emerged when forms of teleological reasoning interacted with major developments in biological thought. This sets the stage for an examination of Pittendrigh’s (Adaptation, natural selection, and behavior. In: Roe A, Simpson GG (eds) Behavior and evolution. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp 390–416, 1958) introduction of “teleonomy” and its early uptake in the work of prominent biologists. We then explore why teleonomy subsequently foundered and consider whether the term may yet have significance for discussions of goal-directedness in evolutionary biology and philosophy of science. This involves clarifying the relationship between teleonomy and teleological explanation, as well as asking how the concept of teleonomy impinges on research at the frontiers of evolutionary theory.

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          The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme

          An adaptationist programme has dominated evolutionary thought in England and the United States during the past 40 years. It is based on faith in the power of natural selection as an optimizing agent. It proceeds by breaking an oragnism into unitary 'traits' and proposing an adaptive story for each considered separately. Trade-offs among competing selective demands exert the only brake upon perfection; non-optimality is thereby rendered as a result of adaptation as well. We criticize this approach and attempt to reassert a competing notion (long popular in continental Europe) that organisms must be analysed as integrated wholes, with Baupläne so constrained by phyletic heritage, pathways of development and general architecture that the constraints themselves become more interesting and more important in delimiting pathways of change than the selective force that may mediate change when it occurs. We fault the adaptationist programme for its failure to distinguish current utility from reasons for origin (male tyrannosaurs may have used their diminutive front legs to titillate female partners, but this will not explain why they got so small); for its unwillingness to consider alternatives to adaptive stories; for its reliance upon plausibility alone as a criterion for accepting speculative tales; and for its failure to consider adequately such competing themes as random fixation of alleles, production of non-adaptive structures by developmental correlation with selected features (allometry, pleiotropy, material compensation, mechanically forced correlation), the separability of adaptation and selection, multiple adaptive peaks, and current utility as an epiphenomenon of non-adaptive structures. We support Darwin's own pluralistic approach to identifying the agents of evolutionary change.
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            The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and predictions.

            Scientific activities take place within the structured sets of ideas and assumptions that define a field and its practices. The conceptual framework of evolutionary biology emerged with the Modern Synthesis in the early twentieth century and has since expanded into a highly successful research program to explore the processes of diversification and adaptation. Nonetheless, the ability of that framework satisfactorily to accommodate the rapid advances in developmental biology, genomics and ecology has been questioned. We review some of these arguments, focusing on literatures (evo-devo, developmental plasticity, inclusive inheritance and niche construction) whose implications for evolution can be interpreted in two ways—one that preserves the internal structure of contemporary evolutionary theory and one that points towards an alternative conceptual framework. The latter, which we label the 'extended evolutionary synthesis' (EES), retains the fundaments of evolutionary theory, but differs in its emphasis on the role of constructive processes in development and evolution, and reciprocal portrayals of causation. In the EES, developmental processes, operating through developmental bias, inclusive inheritance and niche construction, share responsibility for the direction and rate of evolution, the origin of character variation and organism-environment complementarity. We spell out the structure, core assumptions and novel predictions of the EES, and show how it can be deployed to stimulate and advance research in those fields that study or use evolutionary biology.
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              The Structure of Evolutionary Theory

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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                dreso004@umn.edu
                aclove@umn.edu
                Journal
                Biol Theory
                Biol Theory
                Biological Theory
                Springer Netherlands (Dordrecht )
                1555-5542
                1555-5550
                20 January 2023
                20 January 2023
                2023
                : 18
                : 2
                : 101-113
                Affiliations
                [1 ]GRID grid.17635.36, ISNI 0000000419368657, Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, , University of Minnesota, ; Minneapolis, MN USA
                [2 ]GRID grid.17635.36, ISNI 0000000419368657, Department of Philosophy & Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, , University of Minnesota, ; Minneapolis, MN USA
                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4422-7779
                Article
                424
                10.1007/s13752-022-00424-y
                10191995
                37214193
                e84d5448-3830-44a7-9081-cdfe09ddd50b
                © The Author(s) 2023, corrected publication 2023

                Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

                History
                : 14 June 2022
                : 7 December 2022
                Funding
                Funded by: FundRef http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100000925, John Templeton Foundation;
                Award ID: 62220
                Award Recipient :
                Categories
                Original Article
                Custom metadata
                © Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research 2023

                Comparative biology
                adaptation,evolution,goal-directedness,mechanism,purpose
                Comparative biology
                adaptation, evolution, goal-directedness, mechanism, purpose

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