Natural Kinds

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Abstract

What is a natural kind ? As we shall see, the concept of a natural kind has a long history. Many of the interesting doctrines can be detected in Aristotle, were revived by Locke and Leibniz, and have again become fashionable in recent years. Equally there has been agreement about certain paradigm examples: the kinds oak, stickleback and gold are natural kinds, and the kinds table, nation and banknote are not. Sadly agreement does not extend much further. It is impossible to discover a single consistent doctrine in the literature, and different discussions focus on different doctrines without writers or readers being aware of the fact. In this paper I shall attempt to find a defensible distinction between natural and non-natural kinds.

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Most cited references 7

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Problems from Locke

J. L. Mackie (1976)

In this book, Mackie critically examines various philosophical problems raised in John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Mackie carefully considers Locke's treatment of these problems, but also proposes his own resolution of the related issues in contemporary philosophy. In the course of these discussions, Mackie also proposes his theory of a realism combined with a moderate empiricism. In Ch. 1, Mackie considers the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and argues that they might still have some legitimate application. In Ch. 2, he also defends a version of Locke's representative theory of perception. In Ch. 3, Locke's theory of substance is examined and compared with the theories of more recent philosophers, such as Saul Kripke. In Ch. 4, Mackie defends Locke's theory of abstraction against Berkeley's criticisms and suggests his own revision of the theory considered in relation to the problem of universals. In Chs. 5 and 6, Mackie examines and revises Locke's consideration of identity over time and personal identity. Finally, in Ch. 7, Mackie critically discusses Locke's rejection of innate ideas and considers the possibility of a reconciliation of innate ideas and empiricism.

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Author and article information

Journal

Title: Philosophy

Abbreviated Title: Philosophy

Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)

ISSN (Print): 0031-8191

ISSN (Electronic): 1469-817X

Publication date Created: January 1988

Publication date (Electronic): January 30 2009

Publication date (Print): January 1988

Volume: 63

Issue: 243

Pages: 29-42

Article

DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100043114

SO-VID: caeb4087-e59c-41f6-ad76-3461d30c8da5

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https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms

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