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      Repatriation operation in South Australia during the COVID-19 pandemic: initial planning and preparedness

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          Abstract

          With COVID-19 affecting millions of people around the globe, quarantine of international arrivals is a critical public health measure to prevent further disease transmission in local populations. This measure has also been applied in the repatriation of citizens, undertaken by several countries as an ethical obligation and legal responsibility. This article describes the process of planning and preparing for the repatriation operation in South Australia during the COVID-19 pandemic. Interagency collaboration, development of a COVID-19 testing and quarantining protocol, implementing infection prevention and control, and building a specialised health care delivery model were essential aspects of the repatriation operational planning, with a focus on maintaining dignity and wellbeing of the passengers as well as on effective prevention of COVID-19 transmission. From April 2020 to mid-February 2021, more than 14,000 international arrivals travellers have been repatriated under the South Australian repatriation operations. This paper has implications to inform ongoing repatriation efforts in Australia and overseas in a pandemic situation.

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          Most cited references14

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          Successful Elimination of Covid-19 Transmission in New Zealand

          To rapidly communicate short reports of innovative responses to Covid-19 around the world, along with a range of current thinking on policy and strategy relevant to the pandemic, the Journal has initiated the Covid-19 Notes series. Soon after initial descriptions of an outbreak in Wuhan, China, were shared, reports in late January 2020 (https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30260-9/fulltext) confirmed that Covid-19 was almost certain to become a serious pandemic. Despite New Zealand’s geographic isolation, we knew that introduction of SARS-CoV-2 was imminent because of the large numbers of tourists and students who arrive in the country each summer, predominantly from Europe and mainland China. Our disease models indicated that we could expect the pandemic to spread widely, overwhelm our health care system, and disproportionately burden indigenous Maori and Pacific peoples. New Zealand began implementing its pandemic influenza plan in earnest in February, which included preparing hospitals for an influx of patients. We also began instituting border-control policies to delay the pandemic’s arrival. New Zealand’s first Covid-19 case was diagnosed on February 26 (see Figure 1). That same week, the WHO–China Joint Mission’s report on Covid-19 (www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf) showed that SARS-CoV-2 was behaving more like severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) than like influenza, which suggested that containment was possible. By mid-March, it was clear that community transmission was occurring in New Zealand and that the country didn’t have sufficient testing and contact-tracing capacity to contain the virus. Informed by strong, science-based advocacy, national leaders decisively switched from a mitigation strategy to an elimination strategy (www.nzma.org.nz/journal-articles/new-zealands-elimination-strategy-for-the-covid-19-pandemic-and-what-is-required-to-make-it-work). The government implemented a stringent countrywide lockdown (designated Alert Level 4) on March 26. During this period of exponentially increasing local cases, many people wondered whether these intensive controls would work. After 5 weeks, and with the number of new cases declining rapidly, New Zealand moved to Alert Level 3 for an additional 2 weeks, resulting in a total of 7 weeks of what was essentially a national stay-at-home order. In early May, the last known Covid-19 case was identified in the community and the person was placed in isolation, which marked the end of identified community spread. On June 8, the government announced a move to Alert Level 1, thereby effectively declaring the pandemic over in New Zealand, 103 days after the first identified case. New Zealand is now in the postelimination stage, which comes with its own uncertainties. The only cases identified in the country are among international travelers, all of whom are kept in government-managed quarantine or isolation for 14 days after arrival so they don’t compromise the country’s elimination status. Of course, New Zealand remains vulnerable to future outbreaks arising from failures of border-control and quarantine or isolation policies. Most jurisdictions pursuing containment (including mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia) have experienced such setbacks and have responded with rapid reescalation of control measures. New Zealand needs to plan to respond to resurgences with a range of control measures, including mass masking, which hasn’t been part of our response to date. New Zealand’s total case count (1569) and deaths (22) have remained low, and its Covid-related mortality (4 per 1 million) is the lowest among the 37 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. Public life has returned to near normal. Many parts of the domestic economy are now operating at pre-Covid levels. Planning is under way for cautious relaxing of some border-control policies that may permit quarantine-free travel from jurisdictions that have eliminated Covid-19 or that never had cases (e.g., some Pacific Islands). The lockdown and consequent deferral of routine health care have undoubtedly had negative health effects, although total national weekly deaths declined during the lockdown (https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/2020/07/10/weekly-deaths-declined-in-nzs-lockdown-but-we-still-dont-know-exactly-why/). To mitigate adverse economic effects, the government instituted a spending program to support businesses and supplement the incomes of employees who lost their jobs or whose jobs were threatened. There are several lessons from New Zealand’s pandemic response. Rapid, science-based risk assessment linked to early, decisive government action was critical. Implementing interventions at various levels (border-control measures, community-transmission control measures, and case-based control measures) was effective. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern provided empathic leadership and effectively communicated key messages to the public — framing combating the pandemic as the work of a unified “team of 5 million” — which resulted in high public confidence and adherence to a suite of relatively burdensome pandemic-control measures. Future lessons for New Zealand include the need for stronger public health agencies that can better assess and manage potential threats and for greater support for international health organizations, notably the World Health Organization.
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            High prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in repatriation flights to Greece from three European countries

            Highlight Passengers on repatriation flights to Greece from the UK, Spain and Turkey were screened with oropharyngeal swabs on arrival for SARS-CoV-2 infection. Despite almost all passengers being asymptomatic, many tested positive (3.6% from UK, 6.3% from Spain and 6.3% from Turkey), indicating widespread transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in these countries.
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              Is Open Access

              Preparation for Quarantine on the Cruise Ship Diamond Princess in Japan due to COVID-19

              Background Japan implemented a large-scale quarantine on the Diamond Princess cruise ship in an attempt to control the spread of the novel coronavirus severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in February 2020. Objective We aim to describe the medical activities initiated and difficulties in implementing quarantine on a cruise ship. Methods Reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) tests for SARS-CoV-2 were performed for all 3711 people (2666 passengers and 1045 crew) on board. Results Of those tested, 696 (18.8%) tested positive for coronavirus disease (COVID-19), of which 410 (58.9%) were asymptomatic. We also confirmed that 54% of the asymptomatic patients with a positive RT-PCR result had lung opacities on chest computed tomography. There were many difficulties in implementing quarantine, such as creating a dividing traffic line between infectious and noninfectious passengers, finding hospitals and transportation providers willing to accept these patients, transporting individuals, language barriers, and supporting daily life. As of March 8, 2020, 31 patients (4.5% of patients with positive RT-PCR results) were hospitalized and required ventilator support or intensive care, and 7 patients (1.0% of patients with positive RT-PCR results) had died. Conclusions There were several difficulties in implementing large-scale quarantine and obtaining medical support on the cruise ship. In the future, we need to prepare for patients’ transfer and the admitting hospitals when disembarking the passengers. We recommend treating the crew the same way as the passengers to control the infection. We must also draw a plan for the future, to protect travelers and passengers from emerging infectious diseases on cruise ships.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Communicable Diseases Intelligence
                Commun Dis Intell
                Australian Government Department of Health
                2209-6051
                January 1 2021
                July 27 2021
                : 45
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Public Health Medicine Registrar, Department of Health and Wellbeing, Government of South Australia
                [2 ]Medical Intern, University of Adelaide
                [3 ]Nursing Director Infection Control Service, Communicable Disease Control Branch, Health Regulation and Protection, Department for Health and Wellbeing, Government of South Australia
                [4 ]Chief Nurse and Midwifery Officer, Nursing and Midwifery Office, Clinical Collaborative, System Leadership and Design, SA Health, Government of South Australia
                [5 ]Chief Commander, State Control Centre, Department of Health and Wellbeing, Government of South Australia
                [6 ]Deputy Chief Public Health Officer, Deputy Chief Medical Officer, Department of Health and Wellbeing, Government of South Australia
                [7 ]COVID Infection Control Coordinator, Communicable Disease Control Branch, Health Regulation and Protection, Department for Health and Wellbeing, Government of South Australia
                [8 ]Public Health Physician, Human Biosecurity Officer, Communicable Disease Control Branch, Health Regulation and Protection, Department for Health and Wellbeing, Government of South Australia
                [9 ]Public Health Physician, Professional Leadership and Governance, Rural Support Service, Regional Local Health Networks, Government of South Australia
                [10 ]COVID Stream Director, Communicable Disease Control Branch, Health Regulation and Protection, Department for Health and Wellbeing, Government of South Australia
                Article
                10.33321/cdi.2021.45.29
                c72b5be7-26ed-4a07-9822-4e9cfb298929
                © 2021
                History

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