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      Defining and explaining conspiracy theories: Comparing the lay representations of conspiracy believers and non-believers

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      Journal of Social and Political Psychology
      Leibniz Institute for Psychology (ZPID)

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          Abstract

          Despite a growing literature on the topic, little is known about how individuals perceive the label “conspiracy theory”. In two studies, we compare social representations of conspiracy theories, and how these are influenced by individuals’ own conspiracy beliefs. In addition, we examine how these representations relate to how scholars define and explain conspiracy theories. In Study 1, we used lexicometric analysis to explore the vocabulary that French participants (n = 939) spontaneously associated with the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ and the personal definitions they provided. The representation of participants scoring high on the generic conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the content of conspiracy theories (e.g., “lies” or “government”). By contrast, the representation of participants scoring low on the conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the believer (e.g., “paranoia” or “cognitive biases”). They proposed definitions of conspiracy theories centred on the function(s) conspiracy theories supposedly fulfil for the believer (e.g., simplify complex realities). To make sure that these results did not merely express participants’ endorsement or rejection of conspiracy theories, we carried out a second study. In Study 2 (n = 272), we found that the more participants endorsed generic conspiracist beliefs, the less they mobilised intra-individual causes (e.g., reasoning biases) to explain why some people believe in conspiracy theories that they did not endorse themselves. This research shows that people’s representations of conspiracy theories differ depending on their conspiracy beliefs.

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          Most cited references48

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          Notes towards a description of Social Representations

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            Understanding Conspiracy Theories

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              Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale

              The psychology of conspiracy theory beliefs is not yet well understood, although research indicates that there are stable individual differences in conspiracist ideation – individuals’ general tendency to engage with conspiracy theories. Researchers have created several short self-report measures of conspiracist ideation. These measures largely consist of items referring to an assortment of prominent conspiracy theories regarding specific real-world events. However, these instruments have not been psychometrically validated, and this assessment approach suffers from practical and theoretical limitations. Therefore, we present the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale: a novel measure of individual differences in generic conspiracist ideation. The scale was developed and validated across four studies. In Study 1, exploratory factor analysis of a novel 75-item measure of non-event-based conspiracist beliefs identified five conspiracist facets. The 15-item GCB scale was developed to sample from each of these themes. Studies 2, 3, and 4 examined the structure and validity of the GCB, demonstrating internal reliability, content, criterion-related, convergent and discriminant validity, and good test-retest reliability. In sum, this research indicates that the GCB is a psychometrically sound and practically useful measure of conspiracist ideation, and the findings add to our theoretical understanding of conspiracist ideation as a monological belief system unpinned by a relatively small number of generic assumptions about the typicality of conspiratorial activity in the world.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Journal of Social and Political Psychology
                J. Soc. Polit. Psych.
                Leibniz Institute for Psychology (ZPID)
                2195-3325
                2022
                July 27 2022
                : 10
                : 1
                : 335-352
                Article
                10.5964/jspp.6201
                a0565954-38fb-46d2-ba8d-a6ff765989a1
                © 2022

                https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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