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      Violent Conflict and Political Development Over the Long Run: China Versus Europe

      1 , 2
      Annual Review of Political Science
      Annual Reviews

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          Abstract

          Is the traditional logic by which violent conflict fosters long-run political development universal? To help address this question, this article compares Europe with China. While historical warfare was very common across both units, representative government flourished only in Europe. We suggest that the relationship between violent conflict and political development depends on the underlying political geography context. In Europe, political fragmentation was rampant. Thus, conflict tended to be external (i.e., interstate), and attack threats were multidirectional. Furthermore, exit ability was high in this context. Elites were therefore in a strong bargaining position to demand political representation in return for new tax revenue. China, by contrast, was politically centralized. Here, conflict tended to be internal, attack threats were unidirectional, and exit ability was low. The emperor was thus powerful enough to extract tax funds without surrendering political control. In this context, violent conflict promoted autocratic re-entrenchment. We conclude by briefly analyzing the relationships between political geography, historical conflict, and political development in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

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          Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy

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            Democracy and Development

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              Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England

              The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners—secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Annual Review of Political Science
                Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.
                Annual Reviews
                1094-2939
                1545-1577
                May 11 2018
                May 11 2018
                : 21
                : 1
                : 341-358
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, USA;
                [2 ]Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA;
                Article
                10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-064428
                95903486-5201-4ac2-88df-60b42c163ccd
                © 2018
                History

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