293
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
2 collections
    1
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access

      Protecting healthcare workers from SARS-CoV-2 infection: practical indications

      research-article

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisherPMC
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          The World Health Organization has recently defined the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection a pandemic. The infection, that may cause a potentially very severe respiratory disease, now called coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), has airborne transmission via droplets. The rate of transmission is quite high, higher than common influenza. Healthcare workers are at high risk of contracting the infection particularly when applying respiratory devices such as oxygen cannulas or noninvasive ventilation. The aim of this article is to provide evidence-based recommendations for the correct use of “respiratory devices” in the COVID-19 emergency and protect healthcare workers from contracting the SARS-CoV-2 infection.

          Abstract

          This article provides evidence-based recommendations for the correct use of “respiratory devices” in the COVID-19 emergency to protect healthcare workers from contracting the SARS-CoV-2 infection https://bit.ly/2wEcyHW

          Related collections

          Most cited references9

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: not found

          Practical recommendations for critical care and anesthesiology teams caring for novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) patients

          A global health emergency has been declared by the World Health Organization as the 2019-nCoV outbreak spreads across the world, with confirmed patients in Canada. Patients infected with 2019-nCoV are at risk for developing respiratory failure and requiring admission to critical care units. While providing optimal treatment for these patients, careful execution of infection control measures is necessary to prevent nosocomial transmission to other patients and to healthcare workers providing care. Although the exact mechanisms of transmission are currently unclear, human-to-human transmission can occur, and the risk of airborne spread during aerosol-generating medical procedures remains a concern in specific circumstances. This paper summarizes important considerations regarding patient screening, environmental controls, personal protective equipment, resuscitation measures (including intubation), and critical care unit operations planning as we prepare for the possibility of new imported cases or local outbreaks of 2019-nCoV. Although understanding of the 2019-nCoV virus is evolving, lessons learned from prior infectious disease challenges such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome will hopefully improve our state of readiness regardless of the number of cases we eventually manage in Canada.
            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            Three Emerging Coronaviruses in Two Decades

            In the past two decades, the world has seen three coronaviruses emerge and cause outbreaks that have caused considerable global health consternation. Coronaviruses are enveloped, nonsegmented, single-stranded, positive-sense RNA viruses that have a characteristic appearance on electron microscopy negative staining Image 1 . As a matter of fact, the characteristic electron microscopy appearance was the clue to amplify and sequence nucleic acids from Dr Urbani’s (one of the health care providers who died of severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS] in 2003) respiratory specimen using a consensus coronavirus primer. 1 The sequence of the virus was significantly different from other coronaviruses known to cause human disease at the time. The virus was ultimately named SARS-CoV, as febrile patients had severe acute respiratory syndrome and could present with pneumonia and lower respiratory symptoms such as cough and dyspnea. 2 The SARS-CoV outbreak started in Guangdong, China, and spread to many countries in Southeast Asia, North America, Europe, and South Africa. Transmission was primarily person to person through droplets that occurred during coughing or sneezing, through personal contact (shaking hands), or by touching contaminated surfaces. Of note, health professionals were particularly at risk of acquiring the disease, as transmission also occurred if isolation precautions were not followed and during certain procedures. The last case of SARS-CoV occurred in September 2003, after having infected over 8,000 persons and causing 774 deaths with a case fatality rate calculated at 9.5%. Image 1 Electron microscopy photograph of negative stain of a coronavirus (image from the Public Health Image Library). Nine years later, a new coronavirus that causes respiratory disease appeared in the Middle East, thus the name of MERS-CoV. Symptoms of MERS-CoV are nonspecific, but many patients end up with severe acute respiratory distress. In these patients, travel history is imperative, as all cases have been linked to persons in or near the Arabian Peninsula. Similar to SARS-CoV, health professionals are at higher risk of acquiring the disease, as demonstrated in the outbreak in South Korea. 3 However, in comparison with SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV is still circulating, and the case fatality rate is much higher (around 35%). What has allowed control of MERS-CoV is a low R0 (approximately 1), meaning each person with the disease transmits it to only one other person (the SARS-CoV R0 was of approximately 4). In December 30, 2019, a cluster of patients with pneumonia of unknown etiology was observed in Wuhan, China, and reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) China bureau in Beijing. A week later, January 7, 2020, a new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) was isolated from these patients. This virus was initially referred to as novel coronavirus 2019 (2019-nCoV) but was given the official name of COVID-19 by the WHO on February 11, 2020. This new virus has infected more people than either of its two predecessors. Several factors have allowed the rapid spread of this virus: Wuhan is the capital of China’s Hubei province, with over 11,000,000 inhabitants, and it is a major transportation hub, which increases person-to-person contact and adds to the possibility of exporting cases to other locations. At this point, the R0 is calculated between 2 and 3.5, indicating that one patient can transmit the disease to two to three other people. Patients with the COVID-19 infection proven by polymerase chain reaction have been an average age of 55 years (cases in children seem to be rare). 4 They present with fever, dry cough, and shortness of breath and, in the most severe cases, have pneumonia. The case fatality rate is around 2% to 3%. SARS-CoV-2 will cause many more deaths than its predecessors, even though the mortality rate is lower than MERS-CoV infections, because there have been so many more cases. Chinese authorities have taken the global threat very seriously, and the containment measures have been unprecedented (closing airports, train stations, and roads to Wuhan; building hospitals in record time). However, cases with SARS-CoV-2 are already being reported in many countries, including the United States. The question of how to approach these patients for diagnosis and treatment is pressing. For patients in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is continuously updating information and has instructions on who to test and the workflow to follow regarding specimen handling. 5 In brief, testing for SARS-CoV-2 needs to be sent to the state laboratory after consultation with it regarding patient clinical characteristics, the specimens it will receive, and packaging of the sample using shipping regulations for category B agents. Other tests, such as CBC count, chemistries, and microbiology (including molecular testing for other respiratory viruses), can be handled using universal precautions (face protection, gloves, and disposable gowns) in hospital laboratories, so as not to delay other necessary treatment. It should be noted that although some multiplex molecular panels include primers for SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and other coronaviruses responsible for upper respiratory infections (HcoV 229E, NL63, OC43, and HKU1), they do not detect COVID-19. The CDC is advising not to perform viral cultures in patients under investigation for either MERS-CoV or SARS-CoV-2. The WHO also has a webpage with guidance regarding multiple aspects, including surveillance, patient management, and laboratory testing specific for SARS-CoV-2. 6 Once a patient has been defined as infected with SARS-CoV-2, he or she should be treated, taking into consideration airborne and contact precautions. Most of the measures are symptomatic, although some antiviral medications have been used. Last, at this point, reports of autopsies or lung tissue samples of patients with SARS-CoV-2 have not been published. However, based on imaging studies and what we know of SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, patients with the most severe disease will likely show diffuse alveolar damage with hyaline membrane formation, inflammation in the alveolar walls, desquamation of pneumocytes, and, if the case is complicated by a secondary bacterial pneumonia, intra-alveolar inflammatory infiltrate by neutrophils. Any other specific features, such as multinucleated cells or potential viral inclusions, remain to be discovered through pathologic studies of patients with this new virus. In summary, the story of SARS-CoV-2 continues to evolve. Because SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV have had different behaviors, SARS-CoV-2 will likely have unique features of its own that we will learn as the outbreak progresses.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: found
              Is Open Access

              Exhaled Air Dispersion during Coughing with and without Wearing a Surgical or N95 Mask

              Objectives We compared the expelled air dispersion distances during coughing from a human patient simulator (HPS) lying at 45° with and without wearing a surgical mask or N95 mask in a negative pressure isolation room. Methods Airflow was marked with intrapulmonary smoke. Coughing bouts were generated by short bursts of oxygen flow at 650, 320, and 220L/min to simulate normal, mild and poor coughing efforts, respectively. The coughing jet was revealed by laser light-sheet and images were captured by high definition video. Smoke concentration in the plume was estimated from the light scattered by smoke particles. Significant exposure was arbitrarily defined where there was ≥ 20% of normalized smoke concentration. Results During normal cough, expelled air dispersion distances were 68, 30 and 15 cm along the median sagittal plane when the HPS wore no mask, a surgical mask and a N95 mask, respectively. In moderate lung injury, the corresponding air dispersion distances for mild coughing efforts were reduced to 55, 27 and 14 cm, respectively, p < 0.001. The distances were reduced to 30, 24 and 12 cm, respectively during poor coughing effort as in severe lung injury. Lateral dispersion distances during normal cough were 0, 28 and 15 cm when the HPS wore no mask, a surgical mask and a N95 mask, respectively. Conclusions Normal cough produced a turbulent jet about 0.7 m towards the end of the bed from the recumbent subject. N95 mask was more effective than surgical mask in preventing expelled air leakage during coughing but there was still significant sideway leakage.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                Eur Respir Rev
                Eur Respir Rev
                ERR
                errev
                European Respiratory Review
                European Respiratory Society
                0905-9180
                1600-0617
                31 March 2020
                04 April 2020
                : 29
                : 155
                : 200068
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
                [2 ]Dept of Clinical, Integrated and Experimental Medicine (DIMES), Bologna, Italy
                [3 ]Respiratory and Critical Care, Sant'Orsola Malpighi Hospital, Bologna, Italy
                [4 ]Dept of Public Health and Infectious Diseases, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
                [5 ]Division of Pulmonary Medicine, Policlinico Umberto I Hospital, Rome, Italy
                Author notes
                Paolo Palange, Dept of Public Health and Infectious Diseases, Sapienza University of Rome, Via le Università 37, 00185 Rome, Italy. E-mail: paolo.palange@ 123456uniroma1.it
                Article
                ERR-0068-2020
                10.1183/16000617.0068-2020
                7134482
                32248146
                8a9dd80e-be2b-4222-a98d-25098610ea09
                Copyright ©ERS 2020.

                This article is open access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Licence 4.0.

                History
                : 24 March 2020
                : 27 March 2020
                Categories
                Frontiers in Clinical Practice
                4

                Comments

                Comment on this article