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      Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza, International Measures

      review-article
      World Health Organization Writing Group 1 ,
      Emerging Infectious Diseases
      Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
      influenza, World Health Organization, quarantine

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          Abstract

          Closing international borders was usually ineffective in past pandemics and would be less effective today.

          Abstract

          Since global availability of vaccine and antiviral agents against influenza caused by novel human subtypes is insufficient, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommends nonpharmaceutical public health interventions to contain infection, delay spread, and reduce the impact of pandemic disease. Virus transmission characteristics will not be completely known in advance, but difficulties in influenza control typically include peak infectivity early in illness, a short interval between cases, and to a lesser extent, transmission from persons with incubating or asymptomatic infection. Screening and quarantining entering travelers at international borders did not substantially delay virus introduction in past pandemics, except in some island countries, and will likely be even less effective in the modern era. Instead, WHO recommends providing information to international travelers and possibly screening travelers departing countries with transmissible human infection. The principal focus of interventions against pandemic influenza spread should be at national and community levels rather than international borders.

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          Most cited references46

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          Transmissibility of 1918 pandemic influenza

          The 1918 influenza pandemic killed 20–40 million people worldwide 1 , and is seen as a worst-case scenario for pandemic planning. Like other pandemic influenza strains, the 1918 A/H1N1 strain spread extremely rapidly. A measure of transmissibility and of the stringency of control measures required to stop an epidemic is the reproductive number, which is the number of secondary cases produced by each primary case 2 . Here we obtained an estimate of the reproductive number for 1918 influenza by fitting a deterministic SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered) model to pneumonia and influenza death epidemic curves from 45 US cities: the median value is less than three. The estimated proportion of the population with A/H1N1 immunity before September 1918 implies a median basic reproductive number of less than four. These results strongly suggest that the reproductive number for 1918 pandemic influenza is not large relative to many other infectious diseases 2 . In theory, a similar novel influenza subtype could be controlled. But because influenza is frequently transmitted before a specific diagnosis is possible and there is a dearth of global antiviral and vaccine stores, aggressive transmission reducing measures will probably be required. Supplementary information The online version of this article (doi:10.1038/nature03063) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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            Transmission of influenza: implications for control in health care settings.

            Annual influenza epidemics in the United States result in an average of >36,000 deaths and 114,000 hospitalizations. Influenza can spread rapidly to patients and health care personnel in health care settings after influenza is introduced by visitors, staff, or patients. Influenza outbreaks in health care facilities can have potentially devastating consequences, particularly for immunocompromised persons. Although vaccination of health care personnel and patients is the primary means to prevent and control outbreaks of influenza in health care settings, antiviral influenza medications and isolation precautions are important adjuncts. Although droplet transmission is thought to be the primary mode of influenza transmission, limited evidence is available to support the relative clinical importance of contact, droplet, and droplet nuclei (airborne) transmission of influenza. In this article, the results of studies on the modes of influenza transmission and their relevant isolation precautions are reviewed.
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              Strategies for containing an emerging influenza pandemic in Southeast Asia.

              Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A viruses are now endemic in avian populations in Southeast Asia, and human cases continue to accumulate. Although currently incapable of sustained human-to-human transmission, H5N1 represents a serious pandemic threat owing to the risk of a mutation or reassortment generating a virus with increased transmissibility. Identifying public health interventions that might be able to halt a pandemic in its earliest stages is therefore a priority. Here we use a simulation model of influenza transmission in Southeast Asia to evaluate the potential effectiveness of targeted mass prophylactic use of antiviral drugs as a containment strategy. Other interventions aimed at reducing population contact rates are also examined as reinforcements to an antiviral-based containment policy. We show that elimination of a nascent pandemic may be feasible using a combination of geographically targeted prophylaxis and social distancing measures, if the basic reproduction number of the new virus is below 1.8. We predict that a stockpile of 3 million courses of antiviral drugs should be sufficient for elimination. Policy effectiveness depends critically on how quickly clinical cases are diagnosed and the speed with which antiviral drugs can be distributed.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Emerg Infect Dis
                EID
                Emerging Infectious Diseases
                Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
                1080-6040
                1080-6059
                January 2006
                : 12
                : 1
                : 81-87
                Author notes
                Address for correspondence: David M. Bell, Office of Strategy and Innovation, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop D28, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; fax: 404-639-5172; email dbell@ 123456cdc.gov
                Article
                05-1370
                10.3201/eid1201.051370
                3291414
                16494722
                65e04119-7e01-4368-af12-ac3c75e73d4d
                History
                Categories
                Policy Review
                Policy Review

                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                quarantine,influenza,world health organization
                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                quarantine, influenza, world health organization

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