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      Risk of SARS‐CoV‐2 in a car cabin assessed through 3D CFD simulations

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          Abstract

          In this study, the risk of infection from SARS‐CoV‐2 Delta variant of passengers sharing a car cabin with an infected subject for a 30‐min journey is estimated through an integrated approach combining a recently developed predictive emission‐to‐risk approach and a validated CFD numerical model numerically solved using the open‐source OpenFOAM software. Different scenarios were investigated to evaluate the effect of the infected subject position within the car cabin, the airflow rate of the HVAC system, the HVAC ventilation mode, and the expiratory activity (breathing vs. speaking). The numerical simulations here performed reveal that the risk of infection is strongly influenced by several key parameters: As an example, under the same ventilation mode and emitting scenario, the risk of infection ranges from zero to roughly 50% as a function of the HVAC flow rate. The results obtained also demonstrate that (i) simplified zero‐dimensional approaches limit proper evaluation of the risk in such confined spaces, conversely, (ii) CFD approaches are needed to investigate the complex fluid dynamics in similar indoor environments, and, thus, (iii) the risk of infection in indoor environments characterized by fixed seats can be in principle controlled by properly designing the flow patterns of the environment.

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          Most cited references74

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          Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1

          To the Editor: A novel human coronavirus that is now named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (formerly called HCoV-19) emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019 and is now causing a pandemic. 1 We analyzed the aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 and compared it with SARS-CoV-1, the most closely related human coronavirus. 2 We evaluated the stability of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 in aerosols and on various surfaces and estimated their decay rates using a Bayesian regression model (see the Methods section in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org). SARS-CoV-2 nCoV-WA1-2020 (MN985325.1) and SARS-CoV-1 Tor2 (AY274119.3) were the strains used. Aerosols (<5 μm) containing SARS-CoV-2 (105.25 50% tissue-culture infectious dose [TCID50] per milliliter) or SARS-CoV-1 (106.75-7.00 TCID50 per milliliter) were generated with the use of a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum to create an aerosolized environment. The inoculum resulted in cycle-threshold values between 20 and 22, similar to those observed in samples obtained from the upper and lower respiratory tract in humans. Our data consisted of 10 experimental conditions involving two viruses (SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1) in five environmental conditions (aerosols, plastic, stainless steel, copper, and cardboard). All experimental measurements are reported as means across three replicates. SARS-CoV-2 remained viable in aerosols throughout the duration of our experiment (3 hours), with a reduction in infectious titer from 103.5 to 102.7 TCID50 per liter of air. This reduction was similar to that observed with SARS-CoV-1, from 104.3 to 103.5 TCID50 per milliliter (Figure 1A). SARS-CoV-2 was more stable on plastic and stainless steel than on copper and cardboard, and viable virus was detected up to 72 hours after application to these surfaces (Figure 1A), although the virus titer was greatly reduced (from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter of medium after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). The stability kinetics of SARS-CoV-1 were similar (from 103.4 to 100.7 TCID50 per milliliter after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.6 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). On copper, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 4 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours. On cardboard, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 24 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours (Figure 1A). Both viruses had an exponential decay in virus titer across all experimental conditions, as indicated by a linear decrease in the log10TCID50 per liter of air or milliliter of medium over time (Figure 1B). The half-lives of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 were similar in aerosols, with median estimates of approximately 1.1 to 1.2 hours and 95% credible intervals of 0.64 to 2.64 for SARS-CoV-2 and 0.78 to 2.43 for SARS-CoV-1 (Figure 1C, and Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix). The half-lives of the two viruses were also similar on copper. On cardboard, the half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was longer than that of SARS-CoV-1. The longest viability of both viruses was on stainless steel and plastic; the estimated median half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was approximately 5.6 hours on stainless steel and 6.8 hours on plastic (Figure 1C). Estimated differences in the half-lives of the two viruses were small except for those on cardboard (Figure 1C). Individual replicate data were noticeably “noisier” (i.e., there was more variation in the experiment, resulting in a larger standard error) for cardboard than for other surfaces (Fig. S1 through S5), so we advise caution in interpreting this result. We found that the stability of SARS-CoV-2 was similar to that of SARS-CoV-1 under the experimental circumstances tested. This indicates that differences in the epidemiologic characteristics of these viruses probably arise from other factors, including high viral loads in the upper respiratory tract and the potential for persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 to shed and transmit the virus while asymptomatic. 3,4 Our results indicate that aerosol and fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is plausible, since the virus can remain viable and infectious in aerosols for hours and on surfaces up to days (depending on the inoculum shed). These findings echo those with SARS-CoV-1, in which these forms of transmission were associated with nosocomial spread and super-spreading events, 5 and they provide information for pandemic mitigation efforts.
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            Aerodynamic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 in two Wuhan hospitals

            The ongoing outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has spread rapidly on a global scale. Although it is clear that severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is transmitted through human respiratory droplets and direct contact, the potential for aerosol transmission is poorly understood1-3. Here we investigated the aerodynamic nature of SARS-CoV-2 by measuring viral RNA in aerosols in different areas of two Wuhan hospitals during the outbreak of COVID-19 in February and March 2020. The concentration of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in aerosols that was detected in isolation wards and ventilated patient rooms was very low, but it was higher in the toilet areas used by the patients. Levels of airborne SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the most public areas was undetectable, except in two areas that were prone to crowding; this increase was possibly due to individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 in the crowd. We found that some medical staff areas initially had high concentrations of viral RNA with aerosol size distributions that showed peaks in the submicrometre and/or supermicrometre regions; however, these levels were reduced to undetectable levels after implementation of rigorous sanitization procedures. Although we have not established the infectivity of the virus detected in these hospital areas, we propose that SARS-CoV-2 may have the potential to be transmitted through aerosols. Our results indicate that room ventilation, open space, sanitization of protective apparel, and proper use and disinfection of toilet areas can effectively limit the concentration of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in aerosols. Future work should explore the infectivity of aerosolized virus.
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              Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2: the world should face the reality

              Hand washing and maintaining social distance are the main measures recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) to avoid contracting COVID-19. Unfortunately, these measured do not prevent infection by inhalation of small droplets exhaled by an infected person that can travel distance of meters or tens of meters in the air and carry their viral content. Science explains the mechanisms of such transport and there is evidence that this is a significant route of infection in indoor environments. Despite this, no countries or authorities consider airborne spread of COVID-19 in their regulations to prevent infections transmission indoors. It is therefore extremely important, that the national authorities acknowledge the reality that the virus spreads through air, and recommend that adequate control measures be implemented to prevent further spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, in particularly removal of the virus-laden droplets from indoor air by ventilation.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                l.stabile@unicas.it
                Journal
                Indoor Air
                Indoor Air
                10.1111/(ISSN)1600-0668
                INA
                Indoor Air
                John Wiley and Sons Inc. (Hoboken )
                0905-6947
                1600-0668
                18 March 2022
                March 2022
                18 March 2022
                : 32
                : 3 ( doiID: 10.1111/ina.v32.3 )
                : e13012
                Affiliations
                [ 1 ] Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering University of Cassino and Southern Lazio Cassino FR Italy
                [ 2 ] International Laboratory for Air Quality and Health Queensland University of Technology Brisbane Queensland Australia
                Author notes
                [*] [* ] Correspondence

                Luca Stabile, Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, University of Cassino and Southern Lazio (Italy), Via Di Biasio 43, 03043 Cassino FR, Italy.

                Email: l.stabile@ 123456unicas.it

                Author information
                https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4126-4590
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0594-9683
                https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2454-0389
                Article
                INA13012
                10.1111/ina.13012
                9111293
                35347787
                57a9382f-a2c3-4ab1-8ae8-9b749aad97f5
                © 2022 John Wiley & Sons A/S. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

                This article is being made freely available through PubMed Central as part of the COVID-19 public health emergency response. It can be used for unrestricted research re-use and analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source, for the duration of the public health emergency.

                History
                : 09 February 2022
                : 07 January 2022
                : 18 February 2022
                Page count
                Figures: 14, Tables: 7, Pages: 20, Words: 13134
                Categories
                Review Article
                Review Articles
                Custom metadata
                2.0
                March 2022
                Converter:WILEY_ML3GV2_TO_JATSPMC version:6.1.6 mode:remove_FC converted:17.05.2022

                Health & Social care
                car cabin,cfd analysis,respiratory particles,risk of infection,sars‐cov‐2,virus transmission

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