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      Imagining Others’ Minds: The Positive Relation Between Children’s Role Play and Anthropomorphism

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          Abstract

          Children’s role playing, whether personifying toys or imagining invisible friends, involves imagining others’ minds and internal states. Similarly, anthropomorphism – the attribution of internal states to non-human others (e.g., animals, inanimate nature, or technologies) – also involves imagining others’ minds and internal states. We propose that the imaginative process of simulating and projecting internal states is common to both role play and anthropomorphism. The current study investigated the relation between children’s role play and anthropomorphism. Ninety children (5, 7, and 9 years) were administered Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire – Child Form (IDAQ-CF), comprised of the technology-inanimate nature and animal subscales, and the Role Play Scale, which assessed (a) impersonation of animals, people, and/or machines and (b) imaginary companions (ICs), including invisible friends and personified toys. Results indicated that the imaginative act of impersonating an animal, person, and/or machine was positively related to anthropomorphism, and specifically anthropomorphism of inanimate nature and technology. Second, anthropomorphism of animals was highest amongst children with invisible ICs, followed by those with toy ICs and those who impersonated. Finally, children who frequently engaged with an invisible ICs more readily anthropomorphized in general and technology and inanimate nature in particular relative to all other children. Results are discussed in terms of the differing degrees of imagination involved in anthropomorphism of animals versus technology and inanimate nature.

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          Most cited references57

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          On seeing human: a three-factor theory of anthropomorphism.

          Anthropomorphism describes the tendency to imbue the real or imagined behavior of nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions. Although surprisingly common, anthropomorphism is not invariant. This article describes a theory to explain when people are likely to anthropomorphize and when they are not, focused on three psychological determinants--the accessibility and applicability of anthropocentric knowledge (elicited agent knowledge), the motivation to explain and understand the behavior of other agents (effectance motivation), and the desire for social contact and affiliation (sociality motivation). This theory predicts that people are more likely to anthropomorphize when anthropocentric knowledge is accessible and applicable, when motivated to be effective social agents, and when lacking a sense of social connection to other humans. These factors help to explain why anthropomorphism is so variable; organize diverse research; and offer testable predictions about dispositional, situational, developmental, and cultural influences on anthropomorphism. Discussion addresses extensions of this theory into the specific psychological processes underlying anthropomorphism, applications of this theory into robotics and human-computer interaction, and the insights offered by this theory into the inverse process of dehumanization. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved.
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            Machines and Mindlessness: Social Responses to Computers

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              Social evaluation by preverbal infants.

              The capacity to evaluate other people is essential for navigating the social world. Humans must be able to assess the actions and intentions of the people around them, and make accurate decisions about who is friend and who is foe, who is an appropriate social partner and who is not. Indeed, all social animals benefit from the capacity to identify individual conspecifics that may help them, and to distinguish these individuals from others that may harm them. Human adults evaluate people rapidly and automatically on the basis of both behaviour and physical features, but the ontogenetic origins and development of this capacity are not well understood. Here we show that 6- and 10-month-old infants take into account an individual's actions towards others in evaluating that individual as appealing or aversive: infants prefer an individual who helps another to one who hinders another, prefer a helping individual to a neutral individual, and prefer a neutral individual to a hindering individual. These findings constitute evidence that preverbal infants assess individuals on the basis of their behaviour towards others. This capacity may serve as the foundation for moral thought and action, and its early developmental emergence supports the view that social evaluation is a biological adaptation.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Front Psychol
                Front Psychol
                Front. Psychol.
                Frontiers in Psychology
                Frontiers Media S.A.
                1664-1078
                13 November 2018
                2018
                : 9
                : 2140
                Affiliations
                Department of Psychology, University of Montana , Missoula, MT, United States
                Author notes

                Edited by: Gabriella Airenti, Università degli Studi di Torino, Italy

                Reviewed by: Rebecca Ansley Dore, The Ohio State University, United States; Nathalia Gjersoe, University of Bath, United Kingdom

                *Correspondence: Rachel L. Severson, rachel.severson@ 123456umontana.edu

                This article was submitted to Cognitive Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology

                Article
                10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02140
                6243028
                30483176
                3660fdff-4200-406e-8669-e721237a78ef
                Copyright © 2018 Severson and Woodard.

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

                History
                : 17 April 2018
                : 17 October 2018
                Page count
                Figures: 2, Tables: 3, Equations: 0, References: 75, Pages: 16, Words: 0
                Categories
                Psychology
                Original Research

                Clinical Psychology & Psychiatry
                anthropomorphism,pretense,role play,imagination,children,simulation theory

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