Recollections on the Origins and Development of the Prosomeric Model

The neural bases of behavior are often discussed in terms of perceptual, cognitive, and motor stages, defined within an information processing framework that was originally inspired by models of human abstract problem solving. Here, we review a growing body of neurophysiological data that is difficult to reconcile with this influential theoretical perspective. As an alternative foundation for interpreting neural data, we consider frameworks borrowed from ethology, which emphasize the kinds of real-time interactive behaviors that animals have engaged in for millions of years. In particular, we discuss an ethologically-inspired view of interactive behavior as simultaneous processes that specify potential motor actions and select between them. We review how recent neurophysiological data from diverse cortical and subcortical regions appear more compatible with this parallel view than with the classical view of serial information processing stages. Show more

The prosomeric model attributes morphological meaning to gene expression patterns and other data in the forebrain. It divides this territory into the same transverse segments (prosomeres) and longitudinal zones in all vertebrates. The axis and longitudinal zones of this model are widely accepted but controversy subsists about the number of prosomeres and their nature as segments. We describe difficulties encountered in establishing continuity between prosomeric limits postulated in the hypothalamus and intra-telencephalic limits. Such difficulties throw doubt on the intersegmental nature of these limits. We sketch a simplified model, in which the secondary prosencephalon (telencephalon plus hypothalamus) is a complex protosegment not subdivided into prosomeres, which exhibits patterning singularities. By contrast, we continue to postulate that prosomeres p1-p3 (i.e. the pretectum, thalamus and prethalamus) are the caudal forebrain. Show more