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      Mobile phone data for informing public health actions across the COVID-19 pandemic life cycle

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          Abstract

          The coronavirus 2019–2020 pandemic (COVID-19) poses unprecedented challenges for governments and societies around the world ( 1 ). Nonpharmaceutical interventions have proven to be critical for delaying and containing the COVID-19 pandemic ( 2 – 6 ). These include testing and tracing, bans on large gatherings, nonessential business and school and university closures, international and domestic mobility restrictions and physical isolation, and total lockdowns of regions and countries. Decision-making and evaluation or such interventions during all stages of the pandemic life cycle require specific, reliable, and timely data not only about infections but also about human behavior, especially mobility and physical copresence. We argue that mobile phone data, when used properly and carefully, represents a critical arsenal of tools for supporting public health actions across early-, middle-, and late-stage phases of the COVID-19 pandemic. Seminal work on human mobility has shown that aggregate and (pseudo-)anonymized mobile phone data can assist the modeling of the geographical spread of epidemics ( 7 – 11 ). Thus, researchers and governments have started to collaborate with private companies, most notably mobile network operators and location intelligence companies, to estimate the effectiveness of control measures in a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, Chile, China, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States ( 12 – 21 ). There is, however, little coordination or information exchange between these national or even regional initiatives ( 22 ). Although ad hoc mechanisms leveraging mobile phone data can be effectively (but not easily) developed at the local or national level, regional or even global collaborations seem to be much more difficult given the number of actors, the range of interests and priorities, the variety of legislations concerned, and the need to protect civil liberties. The global scale and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the need for a more harmonized or coordinated approach. In the following sections, we outline the ways in which different types of mobile phone data can help to better target and design measures to contain and slow the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. We identify the key reasons why this is not happening on a much broader scale, and we give recommendations on how to make mobile phone data work against the virus. HOW CAN MOBILE PHONE DATA HELP TO TACKLE THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC? Passively generated mobile phone data have emerged as a potentially valuable data source to infer human mobility and social interactions. Call detail records (CDRs) are arguably the most researched type of mobile data in this context. CDRs are collected by mobile operators for billing purposes. Each record contains information about the time and the cell tower that the phone was connected to when the interaction took place. CDRs are event-driven records: In other words, the record only exists if the phone is actively in use. Additional information includes “sightings data” obtained when a phone is seen on a network. There are, however, other types of mobile phone data used to study human mobility behaviors and interactions. X data records or network probes, can be thought as metadata about the phone’s data channel, capturing background actions of apps and the network. Routine information including highly accurate location data is also collected through mobile phone applications (apps) at a large scale by location intelligence companies ( 23 ) or by ad hoc apps ( 24 , 25 ). In addition, proximity between mobile phone users can be detected via Bluetooth functionality on smartphones. Each of these data types requires different processing frameworks and raise complex ethical and political concerns that are discussed in this paper. First, we explore the value and contribution of mobile phone data in analytical efforts to control the COVID-19 pandemic. Government and public health authorities broadly raise questions in at least four critical areas of inquiries for which the use of mobile phone data is relevant. First, situational awareness questions seek to develop an understanding of the dynamic environment of the pandemic. Mobile phone data can provide access to previously unavailable population estimates and mobility information to enable stakeholders across sectors better understand COVID-19 trends and geographic distribution. Second, cause-and-effect questions seek to help identify the key mechanisms and consequences of implementing different measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. They aim to establish which variables make a difference for a problem and whether further issues might be caused. Third, predictive analysis seeks to identify the likelihood of future outcomes and could, for example, leverage real-time population counts and mobility data to enable predictive capabilities and allow stakeholders to assess future risks, needs, and opportunities. Finally, impact assessments aim to determine which, whether, and how various interventions affect the spread of COVID-19 and require data to identify the obstacles hampering the achievement of certain objectives or the success of particular interventions. Table 1 provides specific examples of questions by areas of inquiry. The relevance and specific questions raised as part of these areas of inquiry differ at various stages of the outbreak, but mobile phone data provide value throughout the epidemiological cycle, shown in Fig. 1. Table 1 Examples of questions by areas of inquiry. Situational awareness Cause and effect • What are the most commonmobility flows within andbetween COVID-19–affectedcities and regions? • What are variables thatdetermine the success of socialdistancing approaches? • Which areas are spreading theepidemics acting as origin nodesin a mobility network and thuscould be placed under mobilityrestrictions? • How do local mobility patternsaffect the burden on themedical system? • Are people continuing to travelor congregate after socialdistancing and travel restrictionswere put into place? • Are business’ social distancingrecommendations resulting inmore workers working fromhome? • Are there hotspots at higher riskof contamination (due to ahigher level of mobility andhigher concentration ofpopulation)? • In what sectors are peopleworking most from home? • What are the key entry points,locations, and movements ofroamers or tourists? • What are the social andeconomic consequences ofmovement restrictionmeasures? Predictive analysis Impact • How are certain human mobilitypatterns likely to affect thespread of the coronavirus? Andwhat is the likely spread ofCOVID-19, based on existingdisease models and up-to-datemobility data? • How have travel restrictionsaffected human mobilitybehavior and likely diseasetransmission? • What are the likely effects ofmobility restrictions onchildren’s education outcomes? • What is the potential of variousrestriction measures to avertinfection cases and save lives? • What are likely to be theeconomic consequences ofrestricted mobility forbusinesses? • What is the effect of mandatorysocial distancing measures,including closure of schools? • How has the dissemination ofpublic safety information andvoluntary guidance affectedhuman mobility behavior anddisease spread? Fig. 1 Pandemic intervals as defined by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization [based on ( 52 )]. In the early recognition and initiation phase of the pandemic, responders focus on situational analysis and the fast detection of infected cases and their contacts. Research has shown that quarantine measures of infected individuals and their family members, combined with surveillance and standard testing procedures, are effective as control measures in the early stages of the pandemic ( 26 ). Individual mobility and contact (close proximity) data offer information about infected individuals, their locations, and social network. Contact (close proximity) data can be collected through mobile apps ( 24 , 27 ), interviews, or surveys ( 28 ). During the acceleration phase, when community transmission reaches exponential levels, the focus is on interventions for containment, which typically involve social contact and mobility restrictions. At this stage, aggregated mobile phone data are valuable to assess the efficacy of implemented policies through the monitoring of mobility between and within affected municipalities. Mobility information also contributes to the building of more accurate epidemiological models that can explain and anticipate the spread of the disease, as shown for H1N1 flu outbreaks ( 29 ). These models, in turn, can inform the mobilization of resources (e.g., respirators and intensive care units). Last, during the deceleration and preparation phases, as the peak of infections is reached, restrictions will likely be lifted ( 30 ). Continued situational monitoring will be important as the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to come in waves ( 4 , 31 ). Near real-time data on mobility and hotspots will be important to understand how lifting and reestablishing various measures translate into behavior, especially to find the optimal combination of measures at the right time (e.g., general mobility restrictions, school closures, and banning of large gatherings), and to balance these restrictions with aspects of economic vitality. After the pandemic has subsided, mobile data will be helpful for post hoc analysis of the impact of different interventions on the progression of the disease and cost-benefit analysis of mobility restrictions. During this phase, digital contact-tracing technologies might be deployed, such as the Korean smartphone app Corona 100m ( 32 ) and the Singaporean smartphone app TraceTogether ( 33 ), that aim at minimizing the spread of a disease as mobility restrictions are lifted. Along this line, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and collaborators are working on Private Kit: Safe Paths ( 25 ), an open-source and privacy-first contact-tracing technology that provides individuals with information on their proximity with diagnosed COVID-19 carriers, using Global Positioning System (GPS) and Bluetooth data. Similarly, several European universities, research centers, and companies have joined forces around PEPP-PT [Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing ( 34 )], a collaboration on privacy-preserving, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)–compliant contact tracing. Along this effort, a consortium of research institutions, led by the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), has developed an open Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing protocol and implementation using Bluetooth low-energy functionality on smartphones, ensuring that personal data and computation stay entirely on an individuals’ phones ( 35 ). Recently, Apple and Google have released a joint announcement ( 36 ) describing their system to support Bluetooth-based privacy-preserving proximity tracing across iOS and Android smartphones. As a part of the European Commission recommendation of a coordinated approach to support the gradual lifting of lockdown measures ( 37 ), European Union (EU) member states, supported by the Commission, have developed a toolbox for the development and usage of contact tracing apps, fully compliant with EU rules ( 38 ). SPECIFIC METRICS FOR DATA-SUPPORTED DECISIONS Researchers and practitioners have developed a variety of aggregated metrics using mobile phone data that can help fill gaps in information needed to respond to COVID-19 and address uncertainties regarding mobility and behaviors. Origin-destination (OD) matrices are especially useful in the first epidemiological phases, where the focus is to assess the mobility of the population. The number of people moving between two different areas daily can be computed from the mobile network data, and it can be considered a proxy of human mobility. The geographic areas of interest might be zip codes, municipalities, provinces, or even regions. These mobility flows are compared to those during a reference period to assess the reduction in mobility due to nonpharmaceutical interventions. In particular, they are useful to monitor the impact of different social and mobility contention measures and to identify regions where the measures might not be effective or followed by the population. Moreover, these flows can inform spatially explicit disease transmission models to evaluate the potential benefit of such reductions. Dwell estimations and hotspots are estimates of particularly high concentration of people in an area, which can be favorable to the transmission of the virus. These metrics are typically constructed within a municipality by dividing the city into grids or neighborhoods ( 39 ). The estimated number of people in each geographical unit can be computed with different time granularities (e.g., 15 min, 60 min, and 24 hours). Contact matrices estimate the number and intensity of the face-to-face interactions people have in a day. They are typically computed by age groups. These matrices have been shown to be extremely useful to assess and determine the decrease of the reproduction number of the virus ( 6 ). However, it is still challenging to estimate face-to-face interactions from colocation and mobility data ( 40 ). Contact-tracing apps can then be used to identify close contacts of those infected with the virus. Amount of time spent at home, at work, or other locations are estimates of the individual percentage of time spent at home/work/other locations (e.g., public parks, malls, and shops), which can be useful to assess the local compliance with countermeasures adopted by governments. The home and work locations need to be computed in a period of time before the deployment of mobility restrictions measures. The percentage of time spent in each location needs to be computed for people who do not move during this time. Variations of the time spent on different locations are generally computed on an individual basis and then spatially aggregated at a zip code, municipality, city, or region level. Although there is still little information about the age-specific susceptibility to COVID-19 infection, it is clear that age is an important risk factor for COVID-19 severity. We highlight, therefore, the importance of estimating the metrics mentioned above by age groups ( 6 ). Figure 2 shows an example of such metrics. Fig. 2 Extraction of aggregated metrics from mobile phone data. (A) Raw data representing 1-day mobility of two users. In this example, the area B is a hotspot, as it shows a high concentration of people. (B) OD matrix of five different areas, counting the number of trips from one area (rows) to another area (columns). (C) Contact matrix counting the number of potential face-to-face interactions between age groups. (D) Percentage of time spent at home, work, and other locations. WHY IS THE USE OF MOBILE PHONE DATA NOT WIDESPREAD, OR A STANDARD, IN TACKLING EPIDEMICS? The use of mobile phone data for tackling the COVID-19 pandemic has gained attention but remains relatively scarce. Although local alliances have been formed, internationally concerted action is missing, both in terms of coordination and information exchange ( 22 ). In part, this is the result of a failure to institutionalize past experiences. During the 2014–2016 Ebola virus outbreak, several pilot or one-off activities were initiated. However, there was no transition to “business as usual” in terms of standardized procedures to leverage mobile phone data or establish mechanisms for “data readiness” in the country contexts ( 41 , 42 ). Technology has evolved with various platforms offering enhanced and secured access and analysis of mobile data, including for humanitarian and development use cases [e.g., Open Algorithms for Better Decisions Project ( 43 ) and Flowkit ( 44 )]. Furthermore, high-level meetings have been held [e.g., the European Commission’s business-to-government (B2G) data sharing high-level expert group], data analysis and sharing initiatives have shown promising results, yet the use of metrics and insights derived from mobile phone data by governments and local authorities is still minimal today ( 43 ). Several factors likely explain this “implementation” gap. First, governments and public authorities frequently are unaware and/or lack a “digital mindset” and capacity needed for both for processing information that often is complex and requires multidisciplinary expertise (e.g., mixing location and health data and specialized modeling) and for establishing the necessary interdisciplinary teams and collaborations. Many government units are understaffed and sometimes also lack technological equipment. During the COVID-19 pandemic, most authorities are overwhelmed by the multiplicity and simultaneity of requests; as they have never been confronted with such a crisis, there are few predefined procedures and guides, so targeted and preventive action is quickly abandoned for mass actions. These problems are exacerbated at local levels of governments (e.g., towns and counties), which are precisely the authorities doing the frontline work in most situations. In addition, many public authorities and decision-makers are not aware of the value that mobile phone data would provide for decision-making and are often used to make decisions without knowing the full facts and under conditions of uncertainty. Second, despite substantial efforts, access to data remains a challenge. Most companies, including mobile network operators, tend to be very reluctant to make data available—even aggregated and anonymized—to researchers and/or governments. Apart from data protection issues, such data are also seen and used as commercial assets, thus limiting the potential use for humanitarian goals if there are no sustainable models to support operational systems. One should also be aware that not all mobile network operators in the world are equal in terms of data maturity. Some are actively sharing data as a business, while others have hardly started to collect and use data. Third, the use of mobile phone data raises legitimate public concerns about privacy, data protection, and civil liberties. Governments in China, South Korea, Israel, and elsewhere have openly accessed and used personal smartphone app data for tracking individual movements and notifying individuals. However, in other regions, such as in Europe, both national and regional legal regulations limit such use (especially the EU law on data protection and privacy known as the GDPR). Furthermore, around the world, public opinion surveys, social media, and a broad range of civil society actors including consumer groups and human rights organizations have raised legitimate concerns around the ethics, potential loss of privacy, and long-term impact on civil liberties resulting from the use of individual mobile data to monitor COVID-19. Control of the pandemic requires control of people—including their mobility and other behaviors. A key concern is that the pandemic is used to create and legitimize surveillance tools used by government and technology companies that are likely to persist beyond the emergency. Such tools and enhanced access to data may be used for purposes such as law enforcement by the government or hypertargeting by the private sector. Such an increase in government and industry power and the absence of checks and balance is harmful in any democratic state. The consequences may be even more devastating in less democratic states that routinely target and oppress minorities, vulnerable groups, and other populations of concern. Fourth, researchers and technologists frequently fail to articulate their findings in clear, actionable terms that respond to practical political and technical questions. Researchers and domain experts tend to define the scope and direction of analytical problems from their perspective and not necessarily from the perspective of governments’ needs. Critical decisions have to be taken, while key results are often published in scientific journals and in jargon that are not easily accessible to outsiders, including government workers and policy makers. Last, there is little political will and resources invested to support preparedness for immediate and rapid action. On country levels, there are too few latent and standing mixed teams, composed of (i) representatives of governments and public authorities, (ii) mobile network operators and technology companies, and (iii) different topic experts (virologists, epidemiologists, and data analysts); and there are no procedures and protocols predefined. None of these challenges are insurmountable, but they require a clear call for action. A CALL TO ACTION TO FIGHT COVID-19 To effectively build the best, most up-to-date, relevant, and actionable knowledge, we call on governments, mobile network operators, and technology companies (e.g. Google, Facebook, and Apple), and researchers to form mixed teams. Governments should be aware of the value of information and knowledge that can be derived from mobile phone data analysis, especially for monitoring the necessary measures to contain the pandemic. They should enable and leverage the fair and responsible provision and use of aggregated and anonymized data for this purpose. Mobile network operators and technology companies with widespread adoption of their products (e.g. Facebook, Google, and Apple) should take their social responsibility and the vital role that they can play in tackling the pandemic. They should reach out to governments and the research community. Researchers and domain experts (e.g. virologists, epidemiologists, demographers, data scientists, computer scientists, and computational social scientists) should acknowledge the value of interdisciplinary teams and context specificities and sensitivities. Impact would be maximized if governments and public authorities are included early on and throughout their efforts to identify the most relevant questions and knowledge needs. Creating multidisciplinary interinstitutional teams is of paramount importance, as recently shown successfully in Belgium and the Valencian region of Spain ( 45 ). Four key principles should guide the implementation of such mixed teams to improve their effectiveness, namely (i) the early inclusion of governments, (ii) the liaising with data protection authorities early on, (iii) international exchange, and (iv) preparation for all stages of the pandemic. Relevant government and public authorities should be involved early, and researchers need to build upon their knowledge systems and need for information. One key challenge is to make insights actionable—how can findings such as propagation maps lastly be used (e.g., for setting quarantine zones, informing local governments, and targeting communication). At the same time, expectations must be realistic: Decisions on measures should be based on facts but are, in the end, political decisions. Many insights derived from mobile phone data analytics do not have practical implications—such analysis and the related data collection should be discouraged until proven necessary. We also suggest such efforts be transparent and involve data protection authorities and civil liberties advocates early on and have quick iteration cycles with them. For example, policy makers should consider the creation of an ethics and privacy advisory committee to oversee and provide feedback on projects. This ensures that privacy is maintained and raises potential user acceptance. Aggregated mobile phone data can be used in line even with the strict European regulations (GDPR). Earlier initiatives have established principles and methods for sharing data or indicators without endangering personal information and build privacy-preserving solutions that use only incentives to manage behavior ( 46 – 48 ). The early inclusion of the data protection authority in Belgium has led to the publishing of a statement by the European Data Protection Board on how to process mobile phone data in the fight against COVID-19 ( 49 ). Even while acknowledging the value of mobile phone data, the urgency of the situation should not lead to losses of data privacy and other civil liberties that might become permanent after the pandemic. In this regard, the donation of data for good and the direct and limited (in time and scope) sharing of aggregated data by mobile network operators with (democratic) governments and researchers seem to be less problematic than the use of individual location data commercially acquired, brought together, and analyzed by commercial enterprises. More generally, any emergency data system set to monitor COVID-19 and beyond must follow a balanced and well-articulated set of data policies and guidelines and is subjected to risk assessments. Specifically, any efforts should meet clear tests on the proportionate, legal, accountable, necessary, and ethical use of mobile phone data in the circumstances of the pandemic and seek to minimize the amount of information gathered to what is necessary to accomplish the objective concerned. These are not unknown criteria; they are well inscribed into international human rights standards and law concerning, for example, the use of force. Certainly, the use of mobile phone data does not equate to the use of force, but in the wrong hands, it can have similarly devastating effects and lead to substantially curtail civil liberties. Considering the broad absence of legal frameworks and historical mishandling of data by technology companies, there is an urgent need for responsible global leadership and governance to guide efforts to use technology in times of emergency. We further see a clear need for more international exchange, not only with other domain experts but also with other initiatives and groups; findings must be shared quickly—there will be time for peer-reviewed publications later. In particular, in countries with weaker health (and often also economic) systems, the targeting and effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interventions might make a big difference. This also implies the translation of important findings from English to other relevant languages. For later stages of the pandemic, and for the future, stakeholders should aim for a minimum level of “preparedness” for immediate and rapid action. On country and/or region levels, there will be a need of “standing” mixed teams; up-to-date technology, basic agreements, and legal prescriptions; and data access, procedures, and protocols predefined [also for “appropriate anonymization and aggregation protocols”; ( 46 )]. A long-time collaboration between infectious disease modelers, epidemiologists, and researchers of mobile network operator laboratories in France helped jump-start a project on the COVID-19 pandemic, with the support of public health authorities ( 50 ). Last, in addition to (horizontal) international exchange, we also need international approaches that are coordinated by supranational bodies. National initiatives might help to a certain extent but will not be sufficient in the long run. A global pandemic necessitates globally or at least regionally coordinated work. Here, promising approaches are emerging: the EU Commission on 23 March 2020 called upon European mobile network operators to hand over anonymized and aggregated data to the Commission to track virus spread and determine priority areas for medical supplies ( 51 ), while other coordination initiatives are emerging in Africa, Latin America, and the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. It will be important for such initiatives to link up, share knowledge, and collaborate. The COVID-19 pandemic will not be over soon, and it will not be the last pandemic we face. Privacy-aware and ethically acceptable solutions to use mobile phone data should be prepared and vetted in advance, and we must raise readiness on national and international levels, so we can act rapidly when the crisis hits.

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          How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic?

          Governments will not be able to minimise both deaths from coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and the economic impact of viral spread. Keeping mortality as low as possible will be the highest priority for individuals; hence governments must put in place measures to ameliorate the inevitable economic downturn. In our view, COVID-19 has developed into a pandemic, with small chains of transmission in many countries and large chains resulting in extensive spread in a few countries, such as Italy, Iran, South Korea, and Japan. 1 Most countries are likely to have spread of COVID-19, at least in the early stages, before any mitigation measures have an impact. What has happened in China shows that quarantine, social distancing, and isolation of infected populations can contain the epidemic. 1 This impact of the COVID-19 response in China is encouraging for the many countries where COVID-19 is beginning to spread. However, it is unclear whether other countries can implement the stringent measures China eventually adopted. Singapore and Hong Kong, both of which had severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemics in 2002–03, provide hope and many lessons to other countries. In both places, COVID-19 has been managed well to date, despite early cases, by early government action and through social distancing measures taken by individuals. The course of an epidemic is defined by a series of key factors, some of which are poorly understood at present for COVID-19. The basic reproduction number (R0), which defines the mean number of secondary cases generated by one primary case when the population is largely susceptible to infection, determines the overall number of people who are likely to be infected, or more precisely the area under the epidemic curve. For an epidemic to take hold, the value of R0 must be greater than unity in value. A simple calculation gives the fraction likely to be infected without mitigation. This fraction is roughly 1–1/R0. With R0 values for COVID-19 in China around 2·5 in the early stages of the epidemic, 2 we calculate that approximately 60% of the population would become infected. This is a very worst-case scenario for a number of reasons. We are uncertain about transmission in children, some communities are remote and unlikely to be exposed, voluntary social distancing by individuals and communities will have an impact, and mitigation efforts, such as the measures put in place in China, greatly reduce transmission. As an epidemic progresses, the effective reproduction number (R) declines until it falls below unity in value when the epidemic peaks and then decays, either due to the exhaustion of people susceptible to infection or the impact of control measures. The speed of the initial spread of the epidemic, its doubling time, or the related serial interval (the mean time it takes for an infected person to pass on the infection to others), and the likely duration of the epidemic are determined by factors such as the length of time from infection to when a person is infectious to others and the mean duration of infectiousness. For the 2009 influenza A H1N1 pandemic, in most infected people these epidemiological quantities were short with a day or so to infectiousness and a few days of peak infectiousness to others. 3 By contrast, for COVID-19, the serial interval is estimated at 4·4–7·5 days, which is more similar to SARS. 4 First among the important unknowns about COVID-19 is the case fatality rate (CFR), which requires information on the denominator that defines the number infected. We are unaware of any completed large-scale serology surveys to detect specific antibodies to COVID-19. Best estimates suggest a CFR for COVID-19 of about 0·3–1%, 4 which is higher than the order of 0·1% CFR for a moderate influenza A season. 5 The second unknown is the whether infectiousness starts before onset of symptoms. The incubation period for COVID-19 is about 5–6 days.4, 6 Combining this time with a similar length serial interval suggests there might be considerable presymptomatic infectiousness (appendix 1). For reference, influenza A has a presymptomatic infectiousness of about 1–2 days, whereas SARS had little or no presymptomatic infectiousness. 7 There have been few clinical studies to measure COVID-19 viraemia and how it changes over time in individuals. In one study of 17 patients with COVID-19, peak viraemia seems to be at the end of the incubation period, 8 pointing to the possibility that viraemia might be high enough to trigger transmission for 1–2 days before onset of symptoms. If these patterns are verified by more extensive clinical virological studies, COVID-19 would be expected to be more like influenza A than SARS. For SARS, peak infectiousness took place many days after first symptoms, hence the success of quarantine of patients with SARS soon after symptoms started 7 and the lack of success for this measure for influenza A and possibly for COVID-19. The third uncertainty is whether there are a large number of asymptomatic cases of COVID-19. Estimates suggest that about 80% of people with COVID-19 have mild or asymptomatic disease, 14% have severe disease, and 6% are critically ill, 9 implying that symptom-based control is unlikely to be sufficient unless these cases are only lightly infectious. The fourth uncertainty is the duration of the infectious period for COVID-19. The infectious period is typically short for influenza A, but it seems long for COVID-19 on the basis of the few available clinical virological studies, perhaps lasting for 10 days or more after the incubation period. 8 The reports of a few super-spreading events are a routine feature of all infectious diseases and should not be overinterpreted. 10 What do these comparisons with influenza A and SARS imply for the COVID-19 epidemic and its control? First, we think that the epidemic in any given country will initially spread more slowly than is typical for a new influenza A strain. COVID-19 had a doubling time in China of about 4–5 days in the early phases. 3 Second, the COVID-19 epidemic could be more drawn out than seasonal influenza A, which has relevance for its potential economic impact. Third, the effect of seasons on transmission of COVID-19 is unknown; 11 however, with an R0 of 2–3, the warm months of summer in the northern hemisphere might not necessarily reduce transmission below the value of unity as they do for influenza A, which typically has an R0 of around 1·1–1·5. 12 Closely linked to these factors and their epidemiological determinants is the impact of different mitigation policies on the course of the COVID-19 epidemic. A key issue for epidemiologists is helping policy makers decide the main objectives of mitigation—eg, minimising morbidity and associated mortality, avoiding an epidemic peak that overwhelms health-care services, keeping the effects on the economy within manageable levels, and flattening the epidemic curve to wait for vaccine development and manufacture on scale and antiviral drug therapies. Such mitigation objectives are difficult to achieve by the same interventions, so choices must be made about priorities. 13 For COVID-19, the potential economic impact of self-isolation or mandated quarantine could be substantial, as occurred in China. No vaccine or effective antiviral drug is likely to be available soon. Vaccine development is underway, but the key issues are not if a vaccine can be developed but where phase 3 trials will be done and who will manufacture vaccine at scale. The number of cases of COVID-19 are falling quickly in China, 4 but a site for phase 3 vaccine trials needs to be in a location where there is ongoing transmission of the disease. Manufacturing at scale requires one or more of the big vaccine manufacturers to take up the challenge and work closely with the biotechnology companies who are developing vaccine candidates. This process will take time and we are probably a least 1 year to 18 months away from substantial vaccine production. So what is left at present for mitigation is voluntary plus mandated quarantine, stopping mass gatherings, closure of educational institutes or places of work where infection has been identified, and isolation of households, towns, or cities. Some of the lessons from analyses of influenza A apply for COVID-19, but there are also differences. Social distancing measures reduce the value of the effective reproduction number R. With an early epidemic value of R0 of 2·5, social distancing would have to reduce transmission by about 60% or less, if the intrinsic transmission potential declines in the warm summer months in the northern hemisphere. This reduction is a big ask, but it did happen in China. School closure, a major pillar of the response to pandemic influenza A, 14 is unlikely to be effective given the apparent low rate of infection among children, although data are scarce. Avoiding large gatherings of people will reduce the number of super-spreading events; however, if prolonged contact is required for transmission, this measure might only reduce a small proportion of transmissions. Therefore, broader-scale social distancing is likely to be needed, as was put in place in China. This measure prevents transmission from symptomatic and non-symptomatic cases, hence flattening the epidemic and pushing the peak further into the future. Broader-scale social distancing provides time for the health services to treat cases and increase capacity, and, in the longer term, for vaccines and treatments to be developed. Containment could be targeted to particular areas, schools, or mass gatherings. This approach underway in northern Italy will provide valuable data on the effectiveness of such measures. The greater the reduction in transmission, the longer and flatter the epidemic curve (figure ), with the risk of resurgence when interventions are lifted perhaps to mitigate economic impact. Figure Illustrative simulations of a transmission model of COVID-19 A baseline simulation with case isolation only (red); a simulation with social distancing in place throughout the epidemic, flattening the curve (green), and a simulation with more effective social distancing in place for a limited period only, typically followed by a resurgent epidemic when social distancing is halted (blue). These are not quantitative predictions but robust qualitative illustrations for a range of model choices. The key epidemiological issues that determine the impact of social distancing measures are what proportion of infected individuals have mild symptoms and whether these individuals will self-isolate and to what effectiveness; how quickly symptomatic individuals take to isolate themselves after the onset of symptoms; and the duration of any non-symptomatic infectious period before clear symptoms occur with the linked issue of how transmissible COVID-19 is during this phase. Individual behaviour will be crucial to control the spread of COVID-19. Personal, rather than government action, in western democracies might be the most important issue. Early self-isolation, seeking medical advice remotely unless symptoms are severe, and social distancing are key. Government actions to ban mass gatherings are important, as are good diagnostic facilities and remotely accessed health advice, together with specialised treatment for people with severe disease. Isolating towns or even cities is not yet part of the UK Government action plan. 15 This plan is light on detail, given the early stages of the COVID-19 epidemic and the many uncertainties, but it outlines four phases of action entitled contain, delay, research, and mitigate. 15 The UK has just moved from contain to delay, which aims to flatten the epidemic and lower peak morbidity and mortality. If measures are relaxed after a few months to avoid severe economic impact, a further peak is likely to occur in the autumn (figure). Italy, South Korea, Japan, and Iran are at the mitigate phase and trying to provide the best care possible for a rapidly growing number of people with COVID-19. The known epidemiological characteristics of COVID-19 point to urgent priorities. Shortening the time from symptom onset to isolation is vital as it will reduce transmission and is likely to slow the epidemic (appendices 2, 3) However, strategies are also needed for reducing household transmission, supporting home treatment and diagnosis, and dealing with the economic consequences of absence from work. Peak demand for health services could still be high and the extent and duration of presymptomatic or asymptomatic transmission—if this turns out to be a feature of COVID-19 infection—will determine the success of this strategy. 16 Contact tracing is of high importance in the early stages to contain spread, and model-based estimates suggest, with an R0 value of 2·5, that about 70% of contacts will have to be successfully traced to control early spread. 17 Analysis of individual contact patterns suggests that contact tracing can be a successful strategy in the early stages of an outbreak, but that the logistics of timely tracing on average 36 contacts per case will be challenging. 17 Super-spreading events are inevitable, and could overwhelm the contact tracing system, leading to the need for broader-scale social distancing interventions. Data from China, South Korea, Italy, and Iran suggest that the CFR increases sharply with age and is higher in people with COVID-19 and underlying comorbidities. 18 Targeted social distancing for these groups could be the most effective way to reduce morbidity and concomitant mortality. During the outbreak of Ebola virus disease in west Africa in 2014–16, deaths from other causes increased because of a saturated health-care system and deaths of health-care workers. 19 These events underline the importance of enhanced support for health-care infrastructure and effective procedures for protecting staff from infection. In northern countries, there is speculation that changing contact patterns and warmer weather might slow the spread of the virus in the summer. 11 With an R0 of 2·5 or higher, reductions in transmission by social distancing would have to be large; and much of the changes in transmission of pandemic influenza in the summer of 2009 within Europe were thought to be due to school closures, but children are not thought to be driving transmission of COVID-19. Data from the southern hemisphere will assist in evaluating how much seasonality will influence COVID-19 transmission. Model-based predictions can help policy makers make the right decisions in a timely way, even with the uncertainties about COVID-19. Indicating what level of transmission reduction is required for social distancing interventions to mitigate the epidemic is a key activity (figure). However, it is easy to suggest a 60% reduction in transmission will do it or quarantining within 1 day from symptom onset will control transmission, but it is unclear what communication strategies or social distancing actions individuals and governments must put in place to achieve these desired outcomes. A degree of pragmatism will be needed for the implementation of social distancing and quarantine measures. Ongoing data collection and epidemiological analysis are therefore essential parts of assessing the impacts of mitigation strategies, alongside clinical research on how to best manage seriously ill patients with COVID-19. There are difficult decisions ahead for governments. How individuals respond to advice on how best to prevent transmission will be as important as government actions, if not more important. Government communication strategies to keep the public informed of how best to avoid infection are vital, as is extra support to manage the economic downturn.
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            The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak

            Motivated by the rapid spread of COVID-19 in Mainland China, we use a global metapopulation disease transmission model to project the impact of travel limitations on the national and international spread of the epidemic. The model is calibrated based on internationally reported cases, and shows that at the start of the travel ban from Wuhan on 23 January 2020, most Chinese cities had already received many infected travelers. The travel quarantine of Wuhan delayed the overall epidemic progression by only 3 to 5 days in Mainland China, but has a more marked effect at the international scale, where case importations were reduced by nearly 80% until mid February. Modeling results also indicate that sustained 90% travel restrictions to and from Mainland China only modestly affect the epidemic trajectory unless combined with a 50% or higher reduction of transmission in the community.
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              • Abstract: found
              • Article: found
              Is Open Access

              Projecting the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 through the postpandemic period

              It is urgent to understand the future of severe acute respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission. We used estimates of seasonality, immunity, and cross-immunity for betacoronaviruses OC43 and HKU1 from time series data from the USA to inform a model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. We projected that recurrent wintertime outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2 will probably occur after the initial, most severe pandemic wave. Absent other interventions, a key metric for the success of social distancing is whether critical care capacities are exceeded. To avoid this, prolonged or intermittent social distancing may be necessary into 2022. Additional interventions, including expanded critical care capacity and an effective therapeutic, would improve the success of intermittent distancing and hasten the acquisition of herd immunity. Longitudinal serological studies are urgently needed to determine the extent and duration of immunity to SARS-CoV-2. Even in the event of apparent elimination, SARS-CoV-2 surveillance should be maintained since a resurgence in contagion could be possible as late as 2024.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Sci Adv
                Sci Adv
                SciAdv
                advances
                Science Advances
                American Association for the Advancement of Science
                2375-2548
                June 2020
                05 June 2020
                : 6
                : 23
                : eabc0764
                Affiliations
                [1 ]ELLIS, the European Laboratory for Learning and Intelligent Systems, Alicante, Spain.
                [2 ]DataPop Alliance, New York, NY, USA.
                [3 ]Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Trento, Italy.
                [4 ]University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.
                [5 ]University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
                [6 ]The Alan Turing Institute, London, UK.
                [7 ]Rosa, Brussels, Belgium.
                [8 ]Open Algorithms (OPAL) collaborative project, New York, NY, USA.
                [9 ]Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands.
                [10 ]Telefonica, Madrid, Spain.
                [11 ]odiseIA, Madrid, Spain.
                [12 ]University of Turin, Turin, Italy.
                [13 ]Orange Group, Paris, France.
                [14 ]INSERM, Sorbonne Université, Pierre Louis Institute of Epidemiology and Public Health, Paris, France.
                [15 ]Orange Group, France.
                [16 ]Dalberg Data Insights, Brussels, Belgium.
                [17 ]Freie University, Berlin, Germany.
                [18 ]Technical University of Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark.
                [19 ]Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Madrid, Spain.
                [20 ]Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA.
                [21 ]Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.
                [22 ]Dalberg Data Insights, Belgium.
                [23 ]Aalto University, Espoo, Finland.
                [24 ]Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
                [25 ]The GovLab, New York University, New York, NY, USA.
                Author notes
                [* ]Corresponding author. Email: pvinck@ 123456hsph.harvard.edu
                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0583-4595
                Article
                abc0764
                10.1126/sciadv.abc0764
                7274807
                32548274
                2be09e87-0397-4e51-8637-dc58c1337668
                Copyright © 2020 The Authors, some rights reserved; exclusive licensee American Association for the Advancement of Science. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial License 4.0 (CC BY-NC).

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license, which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, so long as the resultant use is not for commercial advantage and provided the original work is properly cited.

                History
                : 23 April 2020
                : 23 April 2020
                : 27 April 2020
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                SciAdv editorial
                Science Policy
                Coronavirus
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