29
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
1 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: not found

      Potential lessons from the Taiwan and New Zealand health responses to the COVID-19 pandemic

      review-article

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisherPMC
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Approaches to preventing or mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have varied markedly between nations. We examined the approach up to August 2020 taken by two jurisdictions which had successfully eliminated COVID-19 by this time: Taiwan and New Zealand. Taiwan reported a lower COVID-19 incidence rate (20.7 cases per million) compared with NZ (278.0 per million). Extensive public health infrastructure established in Taiwan pre-COVID-19 enabled a fast coordinated response, particularly in the domains of early screening, effective methods for isolation/quarantine, digital technologies for identifying potential cases and mass mask use. This timely and vigorous response allowed Taiwan to avoid the national lockdown used by New Zealand. Many of Taiwan's pandemic control components could potentially be adopted by other jurisdictions.

          Related collections

          Most cited references19

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: found

          Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big Data Analytics, New Technology, and Proactive Testing

            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: found
            Is Open Access

            Contact Tracing Assessment of COVID-19 Transmission Dynamics in Taiwan and Risk at Different Exposure Periods Before and After Symptom Onset

            Key Points Question What is the transmissibility of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) to close contacts? Findings In this case-ascertained study of 100 cases of confirmed COVID-19 and 2761 close contacts, the overall secondary clinical attack rate was 0.7%. The attack rate was higher among contacts whose exposure to the index case started within 5 days of symptom onset than those who were exposed later. Meaning High transmissibility of COVID-19 before and immediately after symptom onset suggests that finding and isolating symptomatic patients alone may not suffice to interrupt transmission, and that more generalized measures might be required, such as social distancing.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              Successful Elimination of Covid-19 Transmission in New Zealand

              To rapidly communicate short reports of innovative responses to Covid-19 around the world, along with a range of current thinking on policy and strategy relevant to the pandemic, the Journal has initiated the Covid-19 Notes series. Soon after initial descriptions of an outbreak in Wuhan, China, were shared, reports in late January 2020 (https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30260-9/fulltext) confirmed that Covid-19 was almost certain to become a serious pandemic. Despite New Zealand’s geographic isolation, we knew that introduction of SARS-CoV-2 was imminent because of the large numbers of tourists and students who arrive in the country each summer, predominantly from Europe and mainland China. Our disease models indicated that we could expect the pandemic to spread widely, overwhelm our health care system, and disproportionately burden indigenous Maori and Pacific peoples. New Zealand began implementing its pandemic influenza plan in earnest in February, which included preparing hospitals for an influx of patients. We also began instituting border-control policies to delay the pandemic’s arrival. New Zealand’s first Covid-19 case was diagnosed on February 26 (see Figure 1). That same week, the WHO–China Joint Mission’s report on Covid-19 (www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf) showed that SARS-CoV-2 was behaving more like severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) than like influenza, which suggested that containment was possible. By mid-March, it was clear that community transmission was occurring in New Zealand and that the country didn’t have sufficient testing and contact-tracing capacity to contain the virus. Informed by strong, science-based advocacy, national leaders decisively switched from a mitigation strategy to an elimination strategy (www.nzma.org.nz/journal-articles/new-zealands-elimination-strategy-for-the-covid-19-pandemic-and-what-is-required-to-make-it-work). The government implemented a stringent countrywide lockdown (designated Alert Level 4) on March 26. During this period of exponentially increasing local cases, many people wondered whether these intensive controls would work. After 5 weeks, and with the number of new cases declining rapidly, New Zealand moved to Alert Level 3 for an additional 2 weeks, resulting in a total of 7 weeks of what was essentially a national stay-at-home order. In early May, the last known Covid-19 case was identified in the community and the person was placed in isolation, which marked the end of identified community spread. On June 8, the government announced a move to Alert Level 1, thereby effectively declaring the pandemic over in New Zealand, 103 days after the first identified case. New Zealand is now in the postelimination stage, which comes with its own uncertainties. The only cases identified in the country are among international travelers, all of whom are kept in government-managed quarantine or isolation for 14 days after arrival so they don’t compromise the country’s elimination status. Of course, New Zealand remains vulnerable to future outbreaks arising from failures of border-control and quarantine or isolation policies. Most jurisdictions pursuing containment (including mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia) have experienced such setbacks and have responded with rapid reescalation of control measures. New Zealand needs to plan to respond to resurgences with a range of control measures, including mass masking, which hasn’t been part of our response to date. New Zealand’s total case count (1569) and deaths (22) have remained low, and its Covid-related mortality (4 per 1 million) is the lowest among the 37 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. Public life has returned to near normal. Many parts of the domestic economy are now operating at pre-Covid levels. Planning is under way for cautious relaxing of some border-control policies that may permit quarantine-free travel from jurisdictions that have eliminated Covid-19 or that never had cases (e.g., some Pacific Islands). The lockdown and consequent deferral of routine health care have undoubtedly had negative health effects, although total national weekly deaths declined during the lockdown (https://blogs.otago.ac.nz/pubhealthexpert/2020/07/10/weekly-deaths-declined-in-nzs-lockdown-but-we-still-dont-know-exactly-why/). To mitigate adverse economic effects, the government instituted a spending program to support businesses and supplement the incomes of employees who lost their jobs or whose jobs were threatened. There are several lessons from New Zealand’s pandemic response. Rapid, science-based risk assessment linked to early, decisive government action was critical. Implementing interventions at various levels (border-control measures, community-transmission control measures, and case-based control measures) was effective. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern provided empathic leadership and effectively communicated key messages to the public — framing combating the pandemic as the work of a unified “team of 5 million” — which resulted in high public confidence and adherence to a suite of relatively burdensome pandemic-control measures. Future lessons for New Zealand include the need for stronger public health agencies that can better assess and manage potential threats and for greater support for international health organizations, notably the World Health Organization.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                The Lancet Regional Health - Western Pacific
                The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
                2666-6065
                2666-6065
                21 October 2020
                21 October 2020
                : 100044
                Affiliations
                [a ]BODE 3, Department of Public Health, University of Otago, Wellington, 23A Mein Street, Newtown, Wellington 6021, New Zealand
                [b ]Epidemic Intelligence Center, Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, 2F, No. 6, Linsen Sth. Rd., Taipei 100, Taiwan
                [c ]Department of Pediatrics, National Taiwan University Children's Hospital, Taipei, Taiwan
                [d ]Global Health Program, Institute of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, National Taiwan University, Rm706, No.17, Xuzhou Rd, Taipei 100, Taiwan
                [e ]Institute of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, National Taiwan University, Taiwan
                [f ]Co-Search COVID-19 Research Collaborative, Department of Public Health, University of Otago, Wellington, New Zealand
                Author notes
                [* ]Corresponding author.
                Article
                S2666-6065(20)30044-4 100044
                10.1016/j.lanwpc.2020.100044
                7577184
                34013216
                1f57abd4-cab3-40ee-98c8-3db1650b062b
                © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.

                Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

                History
                : 13 August 2020
                : 24 September 2020
                : 25 September 2020
                Categories
                Review

                covid-19,public health,epidemiology,health policy,infectious diseases,global health

                Comments

                Comment on this article