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Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic
APPENDIX A. A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency
monograph
Publication date:
December 31 1988
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
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Core Readings in Statistical Mediation Analysis
Author and book information
Book Chapter
Publication date:
December 31 1988
Pages
: 109-113
DOI:
10.1515/9781400859504.109
SO-VID:
8d223271-7ec6-4ec2-b567-66a548abd690
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Book chapters
pp. i
Frontmatter
pp. vii
CONTENTS
pp. xi
LIST OF FIGURES
pp. xiii
LIST OF TABLES
pp. xix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
pp. xv
PREFACE
Backmatter
pp. 1
CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner
pp. 15
CHAPTER 2. Condorcet Efficiency
pp. 30
CHAPTER 3. Social-Utility Efficiency
pp. 38
CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Alternative Spatial Models on Condorcet and Social-Utility Efficiency
pp. 47
CHAPTER 5. Strategic Voting under Plurality Electoral Systems: Decisions under Uncertainty and under Risk
pp. 64
CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency
pp. 79
CHAPTER 7. Strategic Voting for Approval Balloting under Alternative Decision Rules
pp. 89
CHAPTER 8. Empirical Estimates for Single-Vote Plurality and Approval Voting
pp. 96
CHAPTER 9. Other Criteria for Assessing Voting Systems
pp. 104
CHAPTER 10. Conclusions
pp. 109
APPENDIX A. A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency
pp. 114
APPENDIX B. Justification of the Shepsle Utility Function
pp. 117
APPENDIX C. Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2
pp. 121
APPENDIX D. Simulation Results for Approval Balloting with Alternative Decision Rules
pp. 125
APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies
pp. 130
APPENDIX F. Derivation of the Standard-Score Voting System
pp. 133
GLOSSARY
pp. 139
BIBLIOGRAPHY
pp. 145
INDEX
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